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Navy Career Motivation Programs in An All-Volunteer Condition:

I. A Cognitive Map of Career Motivation

Albert S. Glickman
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13. ABSTRACT <p>This report traces the development of a model of Navy career motivation under the all-volunteer condition. This is an outgrowth of three interview studies in which information about factors influential in enlistment and reenlistment decision was elicited. Interviewee samples included men who were at various stages of considering enlistment in the Navy, as well as personnel in three shortage ratings at four points in their first enlistment.</p> <p>Key influences affecting enlistment decisions are explored. On the positive side, these include job training and educational opportunities, financial benefits, travel opportunities and support from peers. On the other side, associated with lack of interest in the Navy, are factors such as perceived loss of freedom, and incompatible job and educational goals. With personnel now in service, the latter factors were further explored in the context of actual experience. Perceived benefits of training and job satisfaction were associated with positive reenlistment intentions, and loss of freedom and unmet expectations were linked to separation intentions.</p> <p>On the basis of these interview data, a longitudinal model of career motivation is described and key points that may be susceptible to administrative intervention are cited. A set of suggestions from administrative experiments and possible means for implementing indicated changes aiming to enhance career motivation are then offered.</p>			

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TECHNICAL REPORT

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INTRODUCTION

The "zero-draft," is now in effect. Implications for the recruitment and retention of qualified and career motivated personnel by the Navy are obvious. No longer can the Navy rely heavily upon men who would rather "take a chance with the Navy" than be drafted into the ground forces. Without leverage provided by the draft, the military services must now meet the same conditions in the labor market as civilian employers in competition for the best men. In addition, there still remains a need for the Navy to establish its own special appeal among eligible populations as a job and career opportunity, while operating within the range of legal and financial constraints applicable to all of the services. In anticipation of this development, the Navy has appreciated the need to take stock of its personnel and organizational practices affecting recruitment and reenlistment, and to look for new and better ways to develop its appeal to American youth and to cultivate their interest in the Navy as a career.

That problems exist in recruiting and organizational practices of the Navy, as they do in any large organization, cannot be denied. However, many problems may not surface for the key decision-makers until they have assumed gross proportions. Because of this, considerable time may pass between a problem's genesis and the initiation of corrective measures. When this happens, the magnitude of the remedy required becomes greater and the impact of the remedial measures is blunted. That is, the opportunity to employ simpler and subtler means is lost. Hence, a major requirement of any evaluation of new procedures is to develop better techniques for obtaining sensitive feedback in order to be able to provide a fuller understanding of problems that need to be resolved. A further requirement is to create organizational procedures, structure and dynamics that increase the odds that knowledge will be put to effective use in a timely manner.

The purpose of this and subsequent reports of the Navy career motivation research project conducted by the American Institutes for Research (AIR) is three-fold: (1) to develop knowledge of the influences affecting decisions concerning Naval service at certain key points in the life of a young man who is a potential or an active member of the Navy; (2) to examine current

assumptions, policies, and practices for the attraction, development, and retention of qualified and motivated personnel with the perspective afforded by this knowledge; and (3) to develop and evaluate new administrative approaches to more effectively cope with the problems of assuming a well-qualified supply of manpower in the Navy.

To achieve these goals, AIR's approach assumes that an individual's actual decision-making processes relevant to career motivation in the Navy must be examined before he begins his initial tour of duty. More specifically, the analysis must be undertaken from the point at which a young civilian starts to ask questions about his direction in life. The individual's decision to join or not join the Navy is contingent upon his current needs, as determined by many factors, including occupational and educational goals, satisfaction with life situation, the influence of peers, parents and relatives, and other influences dealt with in the body of this report. If the individual perceives the Navy's organizational practices and incentives as complementary to his current needs, it might be assumed that he would be favorably disposed toward the possibility of enlisting in the Navy. It should be emphasized that what is of initial prime importance is the potential enlistee's perception of the Navy organization. He compares his needs to these perceptions, not necessarily to the actual "facts." Thus, there is a need for young people and the American public in general to develop new and more accurate perceptions of the Navy if manpower levels are to be successfully maintained.

In order to examine these cognitive processes in depth, individuals' needs, motives and perceptions were scrutinized at certain key periods and situations in life: as civilians interested or not interested in joining the Navy; as civilians perceived through the eyes of recruiters, as junior college students interested or not interested in enlisting; and as sailors in various rates who have served specific lengths of time during their first term of enlistment. The findings of these studies are presented in this report.

Based upon these initial results, survey instruments were developed and mailed to active duty sailors in order to elicit reactions to current policies and practices having implications for personnel recruitment and

retention. That survey phase is more heavily empirical in nature than the initial research, based upon expanded samples of personnel. The findings from that phase of the project will be treated in subsequent reports.

Questionnaire data will later be combined with initial findings to develop a series of specifically targeted experimental tryouts aimed at improving selective recruitment and retention of personnel through the improved design and management of motivation and incentive programs. Inherent in each experiment will be a follow-up study of organizational factors that determine how and to what extent results and recommendations are put into practice. In this manner, new programs and techniques can be continually refined to fit changing circumstances.

Thus, to accomplish these tasks, the initial stage of research which is presented in the text of this report, is used as a basis for further development and action by virtue of its probing nature and heuristic purpose. More specifically, the findings of this research focus primarily upon the development of a conceptual framework reflecting our current knowledge, insights and ideas. This framework is to be drawn upon for the assessment of current procedures and the development of organizational change strategies, which will result in the generation of new administrative approaches aiming to improve the Navy manpower situation. Two types of organizational change strategies will be developed and employed in this effort. The first type will be called an "incentive-change" strategy (e.g., raising pay). There is sufficient empirical evidence to support the assumption that certain incentives applied in a work setting will alter workers' attitudes and behaviors in a predictable fashion, and reinforce the maintenance of these new attitudes and behaviors (cf. Bandura & Walters, 1963; Campbell, 1971). The second strategy will be termed an "organization-system change" strategy (e.g., changing task structure). This technique implies a change within the organization itself, that in turn leads to changes in attitudes and behaviors of members of the organization. Several studies lend support to the efficacy of this approach (cf. Festinger, 1957; Bem, 1967; Breer & Locke, 1965).

Given the size of the Navy and the magnitude of its manpower problems, there are many directions that administrative intervention and experimentation might take. Obviously, it would be virtually impossible to catalog

every possible administrative intervention and evaluate its impact. To most effectively exploit the potential for administrative innovation, a conceptual framework is therefore needed to guide the exploration and evaluation of potential changes that might be implemented--to help identify the problems that are most unusual; to sharpen awareness of the interactions among variables and the practical ramifications associated with given manipulations; to indicate where the system might be most susceptible to change and where change induction could have maximum effect; to offer clues to hypothetical constraints subject to experimentation; to provide bases for designing simulations, to test the limits of generalizations, and so forth.

CAREER MOTIVATION AND CAREER SOCIALIZATION: AN INTEGRATED MODEL

In this report we will develop a conceptual model of the career motivation¹ process in the Navy; how it changes and develops over time, and the factors affecting it at different times for different people.² Such a framework can serve as an heuristic device with which it is possible to derive tentative understanding of how career motivation may be influenced through administrative changes by the Navy. These tentative insights can then be evaluated through specific administrative experiments. Depending on the results of evaluation, administrative changes can then be incorporated into standard operating procedures. The model will first be presented along with a description of its basic components and operating characteristics. Following this description, we will present research data from studies which contributed to the formulation of the model.

As will be seen, three studies were used to generate the model, two in the area of recruiting and one concerned with reenlistment. Each of these studies employed probing interviews in considerable depth designed to elicit information and ideas for hypothesis-generation and experimentation. Following discussion of the career motivation model and its empirical underpinnings, we will point out what we believe to be some of the immediate practical implications of the conceptual framework in terms of potential administrative change. In addition, we will outline some of the implications that our model affords for long-range design and testing of possible administrative experiments.

It is our thesis that career motivation in the Navy is a process that is influenced by specific Naval policies and practices. This influence is initiated at a time when the individual begins to think about the possibility

¹Operationally, "career motivation" can be most simply represented by expressed "reenlistment intention" as an intermediate measure, and ultimately by a decision to reenlist or separate from the Navy at the end of the term of enlistment.

²Two additional goals of the first phase of research have been to initiate testing our tentative model through pretesting of one incentive questionnaire and through a separate career motivation survey. The results of these questionnaire studies will be presented in separate reports now being prepared.

of a career in the Navy. Moreover, the influence of Navy policies has an impact on a growing, developing individual who is, at the same time, subject to adult socialization processes that originate both within and external to the Navy. These different influences cumulate in such a manner as to affect the likelihood of enlisting in the Navy. Among those men who do enlist, this combined Naval and civilian socialization process continues to operate throughout military service. That is, while the person is in the Navy, different Naval policies and practices are operating to influence his career motivation while at the same time he is being subjected to societal influences of various kinds. This general thesis has developed as a result of our research and builds upon a simpler tentative model with which we started when this project was first planned.

Figure 1 is the preliminary schematic of the career motivation developmental process that we first conceptualized prior to undertaking data collection. It shows a number of key factors affecting enlistment and reenlistment decisions, although it was not possible at that time to indicate the relative impact or the directional significance associated with these factors. Since conducting studies of recruiting and reenlistment decision-making, the relevance of these various factors and the nature of their impact has become clearer, particularly as factors are linked and play important roles at different points in time.

In Figures 2a, 2b and 2c, a more complete and detailed schematic representation of the career motivation process of development is presented, including factors that appear to be influencing the process at various points in time. We will describe the manner in which we believe these factors operate, and indicate our present thinking about what appear to be the most important factors that are operative at each stage of the process. The elaborated career motivation model is designed to provide directional significance to some of the influential factors earlier suggested in Figure 1. Conceptually, the refined model may be viewed as consisting of three stages corresponding to Figures 2a, 2b and 2c. The first stage (Figure 2a) encompasses the recruiting phase, where preliminary socialization factors influence the individual's decision as to whether or not to enlist. The second phase (Figure 2b) in the development of career motivation comprises




Figure 1. Model of career motivation process in the Navy, including key decision points and influential factors (from Interim Report, June 1972).





Figure 2a. The career motivation and socialization process model:
Phase I - Recruiting

Rewriting of History:
Place Blame on
Recruiter



Rewriting of History;
Give Credit to
Recruiter

Fig. 2b. The career motivation and socialization process model: Phase II - Early stage of first enlistment




Figure 2c. The career motivation and socialization process model: Phase III - Accommodation

the early stage of the first enlistment, where the recruit first makes contact with living and working conditions present in the Navy. Typically, this stage represents a radical and rapid alteration of lifestyle requiring great adjustment on the part of the recruit. Recruit training is the opening chapter of this phase and serves as an initiation rite during which the recruit receives training designed to provide him with the basic skills, knowledge and attitudes prerequisite for acculturation to the Navy and performance of assignments that are to follow. This stage continues through the period when a new recruit reports for his first assignment at a ship or station (although advanced training may intervene). Transition to the third stage (Figure 2c), occurs when the individual comes to feel that he comprehends the intricacies of life in the Navy. We have called this the accommodation phase to indicate that time when the enlistee has come to grips with the Navy, as he has found it, and has now adjusted to carrying on a normal day-to-day existence in the organization.

These three stages are interdependent insofar as the nature of later stages is determined by earlier events. Also, occurrences during later stages may lead to a reinterpretation of what happened during the early stages. Such reinterpretations have behavioral effects much as do "real" events.

Described below are some of the crucial variables that appear to be involved in the career motivation process.

Recruiting and Initial Socialization Influences

As outlined in Figure 2a, Block 1, a number of different factors may operate to influence a man's decision to enlist in the Navy. Among those appearing in our data are the major roles played by a man's peers and parents. Aside from personal influence factors, the man's own short-term and long-term interests have a part in determining whether he perceives the Navy to be relevant or irrelevant to his future aims. Job training and educational opportunities are particularly important influences in enlistment decisions. For example, perceptions of the Navy's job training and educational programs lead some individuals to believe that their educational and training goals are not compatible with opportunities provided by the Navy. Unfortunately,

few people have much knowledge about actual opportunities that are available, and most individuals therefore have only a vague and distorted image of the kinds of training the Navy can offer. This lack of substantial information increases the perceived likelihood that a Navy enlistment will not be consistent with the attainment of one's job and career goals. Therefore, a man may rule out active consideration of the Navy as a viable job or career option (Block 1a). For other individuals, the Navy may be viewed as worthy of further exploration (Block 1b).

In addition to primary group influences, and the influence of educational and training goals, the model reflects the social context that encompasses changing norms and changing societal values which also operate to affect a man's decision to either explore or disregard the Navy as part of a career option. One particularly relevant contextual factor is the American cultural ethos that has always tended to differentiate the role of an enlisted man from that of an "educated person" (cf. Stouffer, et al., 1949), except to a degree during World War II, when the nation was under direct attack and compulsory military service was well nigh universal. Thus, the fact that youth in our society are becoming increasingly educated, and greater numbers of men enter college or junior college after high school, tends to work against a man's enlisting in the Navy. (The median education of this generation is 12.7 years and more than half of the youth population starts college.)

In addition to increased societal emphasis on education, today's youth also place considerable value on the freedom to make their own decisions (Planagan, 1971). As Levinson (1973, p. 76) has described this change: ". . . we are in the midst of a world-wide social reevaluation, the central thrust of which is the demand of all people to have a role in their own fate." This value is also a prevailing influence in the recruiting process, since the Navy and other military services are commonly believed to severely curtail a person's exercise of "fate control." To the extent that an individual subscribes to these changing values and is obtaining higher levels of education, we would predict a decreased interest in the Navy as a career, unless convincing changes were to take place affecting relevant aspects of the Navy's image.

The sum of these social influence forces, societal changes and career interests operates in specific cases to lead the individual to either explore or ignore potentialities in the Navy (as shown in Block 1b). Given that the man is led to explore the Navy, he then visits a recruiter and begins to discuss his options. Based on the model, we would hypothesize that this initial contact with the Navy is quite critical from the point of view of the individual's preliminary socialization, and, as will be suggested later, may have considerable impact throughout the man's tenure as an enlisted man.

Most typically the individual who visits a recruiter knows very little about the career possibilities available to him in the Navy (or elsewhere for that matter). In general, he appears to be looking for a job rather than a career. That is, he is not intent upon making a long-term commitment to some particular vocation; rather he is trying to find himself and at the same time, obtain training and experience that will enable him to make a career decision at some later point in time.

From our findings, to be amplified in later discussion, we hypothesize that despite his lack of concrete direction regarding the sort of job he would like, the typical individual who comes to a Navy Recruiting Station, even before he sees a recruiter, has all but made up his mind that he is going to enlist in the Navy. Thus, what he is usually seeking from this contact is to establish a sense of direction and gain some meaningful knowledge regarding working options and purposeful activity available in the Navy--grounds for confirmation rather than persuasion or influence from the recruiter as to whether or not he should enlist. We are not suggesting that the recruiter has no influence in the enlistment process. On the contrary, our model indicates that the recruiter does have influence on the enlistee that may have important long-range behavioral implications. However, the recruiter's immediate influence is not evident in persuading a man to enlist so much as it is in giving the enlistee information about the Navy. In essence, we are suggesting that the typical prospect first decides that he wants to enlist and then seeks out a recruiter to supply him with information regarding Navy requirements, qualifications and the choices he can make. The prospect then proceeds to fill out forms and take tests, all the while not having a clear idea of what he would like to do when he actually

enters the Navy. It is usually only after the candidate is found to meet Navy qualifications that the recruiter discusses available options with him. These discussions follow a certain predictable pattern, inasmuch as the recruiter's goal is to enlist the individual and because the Navy's needs are quite specific regarding the number of men needed in particular occupational specialties at a particular time.

In light of these pressures operating on the recruiter, it might be expected that the recruiter would be likely to accentuate positive aspects of the Navy, while minimizing negative aspects. In essence, the recruiter's contribution to the preliminary socialization process takes the form of presenting the Navy in its most favorable light. (Similar descriptions of recruiter behavior have been made by Van Maanen, 1972.)

To depict the Navy in positive terms, the recruiter makes use of information or images of the Navy supplied to him by applicants. He reacts to cues more often than he initiates structure. Thus, if the prospect states his belief that recruit training is difficult, the recruiter is likely to agree, but point out that such training is good for him. In other words, the recruiter is apt to selectively reinforce images presented to him by the prospective enlistee (see Block 2b), trying to cast them in affectively positive terms (e.g., "being at sea is romantic," rather than "being at sea separates you from your family and friends."). The recruiter more often seems to be concerned with sweeping obstacles out of the way of a prospect who has already been impelled, rather than to supply motive power to the prospect (i.e., he tries to maintain the man's momentum toward enlistment).

A second feature of the recruiter's selective reinforcement procedure is dictated by the Navy's manpower needs (for example, the need for individuals to enlist in the nuclear power program). The recruiter stresses certain career fields and lessens the emphasis on other options. In order to make recommendations to the applicant regarding career direction, the recruiter usually takes into consideration career interest information provided him by the applicant and then tries to recommend a seemingly appropriate field within the limited range of the Navy's then current job needs.

However, if the individual's interests lie outside those fields currently enjoying high priority, the recruiter steers the applicant (see Block 2b) into another field that is more essential to the needs of the service.

We hypothesize that insofar as the individual already desires to enlist, but has little concrete knowledge regarding Navy life and the actual array of options open to him, he is highly susceptible to the recruiter's influence when it comes to developing pictures of life in the Navy and to selecting a particular career field in the Navy. He is not in a position to critically evaluate the recruiter's description and recommendations. Susceptibility to influence in ambiguous situations is well-documented in the psychological literature (cf. Walker & Heyns, 1963), and has, for example, been shown to be operative among individuals who are about to pass through an organizational boundary (Schein, 1968). When the individual does enlist, he begins to learn of other options that may actually have been available, but inasmuch as his career goals were not fixed to begin with, the recruit may initially accept this situation as necessary. As suggested by the model, the implications of the recruiter's influence on career placement decisions may have later impact on the attitudes and behavior of the sailor when he finally comes to realize the full significance of his job choice, and when he reports his reactions to others.

Thus, in addition to the apparent influence of the recruiter on the enlistee's career choice, our model suggests that there are other outcomes of the preliminary socialization process that may crucially affect the later development of career motivation. In general, most individuals who begin their enlistment have a highly positive and idealized image of the Navy and its programs.

Specifically, the prospective recruit often feels that by joining the Navy he is assuring himself of playing a masculine role by doing rigorous work (i.e., "doing a man's job."). He also probably believes that by joining the Navy, the work he will be doing will be important and will have some definite purpose (e.g., the defense of his country). Secondly, the recruit usually believes that the Navy operates with efficiency and discipline typical of the military attributes which he probably hopes to adopt

as his own. Third, he has been told (possibly by his friends) that the Navy and other military services have good leadership and that supervisors in the Navy, more than those found in private industry, know what they have to do and how to get it done. Fourth, he is inclined to believe that by joining the Navy he will be able to develop valuable job skills that will be useful later on, particularly when he returns to civilian life.

These beliefs and perceptions of the Navy are important to the enlistee and serve as the backdrop against which later events are evaluated. It may be that, to the extent these cognitions are overly idealized, negative reactions to Navy experiences develop.

Early in the First Enlistment: Recruit Training and First Duty Station

Following the career motivation model, a recruit's experiences early in the first tour of duty appear as a particularly significant aspect of the socialization process (See Figure 2b). It might be predicted that subsequent development of career motivation is a function of the individual's experiences early in his tour, his personal characteristics and the kind of preliminary socialization influences he was subjected to before he enlisted. The kinds of expectancies the individual had regarding life and work in the Navy come into play at this stage. During the individual's recruit training (see Block 4), it is quite likely that many of his expectations are reaffirmed (see Block 4b). That is, he engages in physical training which probably fits with his idealized image of what happens during boot camp. However, for some, the physical training probably results in an expectancy disconfirmation (see Block 4a) since the Navy is perceived by many to be less physically oriented than the other services (Gilbert, 1972).

Toward the end of boot camp a variety of expectancy disconfirmations are likely as the individual compares his expectations with the "real" Navy. Thus, many recruits begin to find that some anticipated conditions and situations do not materialize or do not exist as expected. This particular reality confrontation or, as Hughes (1958) has termed it, "reality shock" is first likely to occur when the recruit is assigned to his Class A school.¹ As will be described later in a discussion of results, many of those we interviewed claimed that during classification interviews, they

¹We have dealt only with recruits who go to Class A schools, hence this model does not include the direct-to-fleet assigned route.

were assigned to a school other than the one they believed they had been promised (see Block 4a). Our data do not indicate whether the man had actually been guaranteed a school or not; however, the important fact to consider is that these men believed they were going to be placed in specific schools, and instead were denied what they felt was the school of their choice. Whether this belief is reality-based or not, the negative affect, as indicated in Figure 2c, would lessen interest in reenlisting. (It might be noted that "their choice" in many instances was not one that they had made in advance of being recruited. Their choice of schools was a product of interaction with the recruiter--i.e., the recruit had accepted the recruiter's choice as his own.)

While school assignments appear to represent the first case of expectancy disconfirmation for many recruits (see Block 4a), the model suggests that its impact is not to be minimized, because it can have a continuing effect upon the man's perceptions of the Navy and his motivation through the remainder of his tour of duty. For those individuals who receive the school of their choice (see Block 4b), there is little problem and such individuals are likely to maintain a fairly positive view of the Navy.

During his first duty assignment (see Block 5), the man's expectations concerning Naval leadership become quite salient. As noted previously, one of the primary expectancies established during preliminary socialization is that the Navy is an efficiently run organization and that Navy supervision is quite good when compared to civilian supervision. Indoctrination during recruit training aims to reinforce this expectation and the men are led to believe that supervisors will be models of a behavioral ideal, nearly infallible and always competent.

Instead of confirming this idealized view of supervision, it is likely that a second expectancy disconfirmation may occur (see Block 5a). For many men, officers come to be perceived as indeed fallible mortals, who are quite often inefficient or unmotivated, and who seem many times to be primarily concerned with asserting their authority and power. In addition, since the enlisted man has received technical training in his occupational

field, he may soon learn that he has technical competence superior in some respects to that of his officers. . When officers appear to give inappropriate orders due to lack of knowledge, credibility and respect suffer. The model suggests that these perceptions of leadership can be, in part, attributed to counterproductive socialization inputs during recruiting and recruit training that serve to inflate the enlisted man's expectations, with the result that likelihood of expectancy disconfirmation is increased when the individual actually works with Navy leaders.

When expectancy disconfirmation and deflation occur, in turn, they dispose the sailor to a "negative set" toward the Navy in general, and a lessened likelihood that individuals will want to reenlist. These results are consistent with previous findings (Glickman, 1961) showing that many men become disenchanted when they first confront the reality of Navy life after recruit training.

The model indicates that among those individuals not subjected to expectancy disconfirmation of the sort described (see Block 5b), are those individuals who are more likely to reenlist when their tour of duty is completed.

This reality-testing has a continuing effect upon an individual's adaptation during the remainder of his tour in the Navy (as indicated in Figures 2b and 2c). For this reason, it is important that preliminary organizational socialization (by the recruiter and in recruit training) more accurately reflect life and working conditions in the Navy. To the degree that the early socialization process imparts an overly sanguine image of the Navy, the recruit will have difficulty when his highly positive expectations are not met, with resultant dysfunctional consequences ("backlash") for career motivation. On the basis of the model, it might be suggested that presenting a more accurate picture of the Navy would lead to enhanced development of career motivation. This suggestion is supported by the work of Weitz (1956) and Wanous (1972), where it was found that more accurate job expectations, including knowledge of negative job aspects, led to a lessening of turnover.

Accommodation Phase

As the enlisted man assimilates the cognitions and perceptions of the Navy generated by reality-testing of his expectations, he engages in adaptation processes through which he attempts to accommodate his life style to the requirements of the Navy and his personal needs (see Figure 2c, Block 6). Several features of the accommodation phase need to be recognized and will be further discussed. First, individuals entering this phase vary greatly in their view of the Navy. As a description of the early phase of enlistment indicated, a number of individuals have developed a negative set toward reenlisting, while others are positive or at least neutral in their orientation. It might be anticipated that individuals who have different "sets" upon entering this phase, probably accommodate in different ways, with concomitant affect on their career motivation. Another important aspect of the accommodation phase is that it takes place during a period of personal change in the lives of most enlisted men. They mature from late adolescence to manhood; many get married and begin thinking of raising a family. These changes also have a profound effect upon the individual and his feelings about the Navy. In general, personal changes make various situations and conditions in the Navy increasingly salient to the individual, (see Block 7) in turn affecting his disposition toward the Navy and the likelihood of his reenlisting (see Blocks 7a and 7b).

For those enlisted men who enter the accommodation phase with a "negative set," this phase tends to involve cumulating grievances, where the individual may both actively seek out and/or selectively retain in memory those events that provide reinforcement for his predominately negative view (a self-fulfilling prophecy). The accommodation phase, then, serves as a holding stage where the man does what he has to, to get by, and essentially waits out his tour of duty until the end of his enlistment. Since far more men intend to, and actually do "get out" of the Navy than do "stay in," the environment naturally supplies more negative than positive reinforcements.

The adaptive processes taking place during the accommodation phase are quite different among those persons who enter this phase with a predominately positive or "open" view of the Navy. Since they tend to be at

least undecided about a career in the Navy, if not actually convinced of its merits, they are not so much looking for reinforcement of negative attitudes as they are trying to weigh both positive and negative aspects of a career in the Navy. The experiences that the enlistee has during this time and the nature of the system with which he interacts during this accommodation phase have their greatest impact on those individuals whose reenlistment decisions have still not been made. Underlying these effects of the organization on the individual is the general maturing process through which the enlisted man changes from an adolescent to a man. Particularly important for our purposes is that many enlisted men enter the Navy at about age 18 or 19 and complete their enlistment at age 22 or 23. During this time many of their values and career interests change and become more differentiated. Thus, as noted earlier, many of the men who visit a recruiter have little knowledge regarding what they would like to do with their lives; they enter the Navy with the idea that they will learn a trade and "find themselves." In fact, many enlisted men do come to some conclusions regarding their career goals as a result of knowledge and experience gained during the first enlistment. Thus, it is for many the first time that they engage in sustained job activity as part of a larger organizational effort and are exposed to value systems of a large number of people. Through this exposure they are able to examine their tentative career interests in long-range perspective and make decisions regarding their future. From the foregoing, it is clear that organizational changes instituted by the Navy to enhance career motivation must be developed against the perspective of a changing, developing individual. Given that the individual is changing both personally and vocationally, such changing characteristics affect the manner in which different organizational characteristics will influence his career motivation.

We cite several examples. To begin with, many enlisted men decide to get married during the first tour of duty. This change in marital status has several effects. First, and perhaps most critical, the extent of separation endured by a married couple tends most often to have aversive consequences that, in turn, lead to decisions to leave the Navy.

A closely related aspect that becomes increasingly salient is that the married man perceives that he is confronted with a relative lack of control over the course of his life when compared to his married civilian counterparts. Typically, decisions regarding where to live and how to raise a family are made jointly by husband and wife. In the Navy, however, the husband and wife lack ultimate control over this class of decisions, thus leading them to feel powerless. Furthermore, enforced absence deprives the man of considerable exercise of authority and influence in the role of father, and also deprives the wife of psychological support in the raising of children.

As will be illustrated in later discussion, a number of enlisted men cited the inability to make family plans as the basis for feeling that the course of their lives is too dependent upon decisions made by those in authority. Naturally, the wife's feeling of powerlessness in the situation leads her to put pressure on her husband, thereby making it more likely that he will decide to leave the Navy. Related to this is the appearance of what has been described by one Navy official as the "burr effect"--as his spouse exerts pressure, the sailor begins to look at factors such as leadership with a more critical eye, and he becomes less willing to tolerate leadership practices which fall short of his (or her?) ideal. On the other hand, a factor that assumes increasing importance with marriage is that particular Navy benefits are taken more seriously. Thus, the availability of insurance and medical benefits are viewed quite positively by married enlistees, as are increased allowances for family men. The availability of these sorts of benefits constitute positive counterbalancing appeals for some married enlisted men. Finally, there are a number of less tangible attributes of the Navy that become more salient when the enlisted man marries. As is the case with most men who marry, job security becomes more highly valued, and the fact that the Navy offers a great deal of job security becomes more important for these men as a positive attribute of the service. One might predict, therefore, that the more individuals are concerned with job security, the more likely are they to remain in the Navy.

The model thus suggests that the decision to marry by enlisted men usually increases the extent of difficulty they encounter by staying in the Navy and the extent of their dissatisfaction, although certain attributes of the Navy make its career opportunities attractive for married men. When viewed as part of the accommodation process, in overall terms, men who get married in their first term are less likely to become career-motivated and are more interested in returning to civilian life.

It would seem that during the first enlistment the overall result of these personal changes involving maturation and marriage plans is lessened career motivation, given the present environment and structure of the Navy. While the individual undergoes change he perceives that the Navy does not change to meet his newly developed needs, yet he must still adapt to the "needs of the service." This seemingly one-sided adaptation is viewed as inequitable by enlisted men and leads them to perceive reenlistment as undesirable.

To the extent that individuals do experience responsiveness to their changing needs, the model suggests that the outcome would be greater career motivation. It might be noted that while many large organizations may be characterized as "inflexible," this need not be the case. There are a number of avenues that may be taken to allow for greater flexibility of career goals and lifestyle. For example, it might be feasible to make cross-training available so that an enlisted man is not forever "locked in" to a job without opportunity for change during his enlistment. Greater flexibility might be built into the system to allow for change in rating, assuming he is no longer interested in his initial job choice and can fulfill the requirements and obligations associated with a shift to a preferred alternative.

Cumulation of positive or negative sets. During the accommodation phase, enlisted men come to some decision about whether or not to pursue a career in the Navy. However, as represented by the model, it is clear that some of the more significant factors affecting this decision occur quite early in the enlistment, prior to the accommodation phase. Hence, by the time the individual has reached the accommodation phase, he typically has developed either a positive or negative set toward the Navy

(see Blocks 5a and 5b), although some individuals may still be undecided. As a result, it might be anticipated that the enlisted man's perceptions of events in the accommodation phase are rather one-sided and tend to encourage self-fulfilling prophecies. For the individual who begins the accommodation phase with a negative set, most events are seen from the dark side (see Block 7a), while for those who begin with a positive set, there is greater probability that they will view subsequent events through rose-tinted glasses (see Block 7b). Negative attitudes further reinforce the development of additional negative affect and result in the reinterpretation (or rewriting) of history to justify a negative view of the Navy (see Block 8a). Similarly, positive attitudes toward the Navy allow the individual to maintain a positive (or at least a neutral) view of events taking place during the accommodation phase (see Block 8a).

In effect, once the individual comes to some conclusion about whether to remain in the Navy or leave it, cognitive dissonance processes (Festinger, 1957) are activated. That is, for those men deciding to reenlist, there is a reinterpretation of previous events, such that they are viewed in a way that is consistent with the reenlistment decision. Analogously, when an individual makes up his mind to leave the Navy at the end of his enlistment, he reinterprets events to make them consonant with his decision. Such rewriting of history tends to solidify his earlier decision and makes him resistant to influences that would lead him to change his mind.

An Overview

In summary, the applicant comes to the Navy with a generalized favorable disposition toward the Navy. The development of career motivation in more crystallized and differentiated terms is begun as the individual explores opportunities for himself in the Navy with a recruiter. Reenlistment intention may be enhanced or lessened at various points prior to or during the first enlistment. The model presented indicates that the development of career motivation during a first enlistment tour of duty goes through three stages, during each of which it may be influenced by a number of different factors. As described, key factors include the extent of

expectancy disconfirmation, social and personal changes affecting the individual, various leadership and climate factors, and perceived loss of personal freedom in the Navy, as well as the various interactions among these factors.

On the basis of the model it may be suggested that career development is both a cumulative process, in which the events taking place in early stages affect the nature of influences operating at later stages, and a retrospective process whereby events occurring later in time lead to a reinterpretation of earlier events. Such reinterpretation and resultant affect then, lead to behavioral effects at a later time.

The foregoing describes the model of career motivation as formulated in our study. In order to amplify the rationale underlying this model and the data supporting the various model components, the discussion will now turn to three interview studies concerned with influential factors affecting recruiting and reenlistment.

THE RECRUITING STUDIES

The utility of the career motivation and socialization model described above lies in the fact that it can serve as a heuristic guide to future research and administrative experiments in this area. The career motivation model derives, in part, from three studies that we have conducted. Two are concerned with enlistment processes and one is concerned with reenlistment decision-making. All three studies are rather similar in nature and employ depth interview procedures. In this section, two studies on recruiting will be described. Study I is concerned with factors influencing enlistment decisions of men who have made contact with a Navy recruiter, while Study II focuses on factors influencing attitudes of junior college students toward enlistment in the Navy.

The aim of both studies can be summarized in a series of questions: What factors lead people to view enlisting in the Navy as attractive? What factors make enlisting unattractive? In what domain are these factors located? In the policy system? In public image? In personal experiences and characteristics? Are key influences to be found among friends or family? These questions represent the basis of a conceptual framework guiding the research undertaken in Studies I and II.

Method

The principal data-gathering technique used in both studies entailed a probing interview. In each study the structure and goal of the interview were virtually the same. That is, the interviewer attempted to elicit a description of factors influencing the interviewee's enlistment decision: how each factor influenced him and why it was important.

To initiate the interview, respondents were given assurance that their responses would remain confidential and information would only be reported on a group basis. The fact that the interviewers were able to establish reasonable rapport with respondents is evident from the amount of personal information revealed by individuals in the course of describing current influences on their decision-making. The interview, itself, was conducted in a relaxed atmosphere where the respondent was free to answer questions in an open-ended fashion. The questions typically raised during the

interview are illustrated in the interview guides found in Appendix A. While there was no stereotyped set of questions posed to each interviewee (because the questions were geared to idiosyncratic situations for each individual), the interviewers did have an outline of topics to be covered and these topics were essentially the same for both studies. The interviewer probed the influence of peers, parents, the recruiter, and educational and job goals, as they may have affected the decision to enlist.

During interviews, the interviewer took notes and later developed these notes into more complete interview protocols. A sample of protocols were then independently coded to establish reliability.

Study I - Recruiting interviews. Interviews were conducted with two different samples of potential Navy enlistees. One set of interviews was carried out with fifty-three men who had been to see a Navy recruiter and had subsequently made some form of commitment to enlist. These interviews were conducted at Armed Forces Entrance Examination Stations in Baltimore, Maryland; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Raleigh, North Carolina. Interviewees at these locations had consented to take all the physical and psychological tests required to enlist in the Navy, and were quite serious about their intention to enlist. Follow-ups of these men revealed that, with only two exceptions, all interviewees eventually enlisted in the Navy. The two individuals who did not enlist were found to lack necessary physical qualifications. However, inasmuch as these persons were motivated to enlist and did not drop out of the recruiting procedure voluntarily, and since we were concerned with motivational factors affecting enlistment, these two individuals were included in our sample of enlistees.

The following is a list of definitions for positive response categories developed for the sample of individuals interested in enlisting:

- 1) Financial/Security: implies that the respondent was interested in enlisting in the Navy because of the level of salary in the Navy and/or the job security. This includes factors such as retirement, medical care, etc.
- 2) Educational Benefits: the respondent cited formal education, received while in or out of the service, as a reason for wanting to join.

- 3) Job Training (in service): refers to the individual being interested in the Navy because of training received (in Navy schools or on the job) or actual work to be performed as part of military duties.
- 4) Guarantees: the individual was inclined to join the Navy because of guarantees ostensibly promised by the recruiter, including choice of duty location, job, school, etc.
- 5) Family in the Navy: someone in the subject's immediate family having had experience in the Navy, and attempted to influence the interviewee.
- 6) Father: positive influence to join the Navy by the father.
- 7) Mother: positive influence to join the Navy by the mother.
- 8) Male Peers: positive influence from male friends, including those who have had Navy experience.
- 9) Female Peers: positive influence from female friends, including girl friends and wives.
- 10) Other Relatives: positive influence from any relative who has had Navy experience, aside from the immediate family.
- 11) Recruiter: the individual cited the recruiter as a reason for his interest in the Navy.
- 12) Travel: the idea of travel appealed to the respondent.
- 13) Maturity: the prospect of the respondent maturing or "getting his head together," or making something of himself, was seen as an appealing attribute of the Navy.
- 14) Buddy System: going in with a buddy on the buddy system was cited as a benefit of enlisting in the Navy.
- 15) Draft: having a low draft number as a determining factor.

- 16) Sea/Ship Image: liking the sea or ships led the individual to consider the Navy.
- 17) Patriotism: enlisting in the Navy because he felt it is his duty, or that he wanted to do something for his country.
- 18) Military Life Style: the respondent liked the general military life style and was interested in the Navy for that reason.

The second sample interviewed in Study I was comprised of two subgroups. One subgroup (n=28) consisted of individuals who had been to see a Navy recruiter, but despite this contact, decided not to enlist. Members of the second subgroup (n=30) had received recruiting information about the Navy and, for various reasons described in the interviews, did not go further in the recruiting process. Interviewees in these two subgroups resided in the Washington, Philadelphia, and New York recruiting districts.

The following is the list of definitions for positive categories represented in the protocols for this sample:

- 1) Father: favorably influenced the respondent toward the Navy.
- 2) Mother: favorably influenced the respondent toward the Navy.
- 3) Male Peers: friends, (including those in the service) attempted to influence the individual to enlist in the Navy.
- 4) Female Peers: the individual's wife or girl friend attempted to influence the individual to enlist.
- 5) Other Relatives: relatives outside immediate family favorably influenced the individual regarding the Navy.
- 6) Family in Navy: members of immediate family attempted to influence the individual favorably regarding the Navy.
- 7) Job Training: individual cited advantages of Navy job training, including Navy schooling.
- 8) Educational Benefits: individual wish to receive G.E.D. or G.I. Bill benefits for education.
- 9) Financial/Security: financial and/or job security of service was viewed as a positive attribute of the Navy.

- 10) Travel: travel was appealing to the respondent.
- 11) Draft: interested in enlisting to avoid the draft.
- 12) Guarantees: such as job training guarantees, 180-day delay, etc.
- 13) Maturity: join to become a "man."
- 14) Sea/Ship Image: the individual stated that he found ships and/or the sea attractive.
- 15) Situational Dissatisfaction: the respondent said that he was dissatisfied with present job or life situation and therefore was interested in the Navy.
- 16) Patriotism: felt that he wanted to serve his country.
- 17) Military Life Style: enjoyed life style of military.
- 18) Recruiter: positive influence of recruiter.
- 19) Buddy System: liked the idea of enlisting with a buddy.

The following is the list of definitions for negative response categories represented in the protocols for this sample:

- 1) Father: father was opposed to the respondent's joining the Navy.
- 2) Mother: mother was opposed to his enlisting.
- 3) Male Peers: friends (including those in some service) tried to influence the individual against enlisting in the service.
- 4) Female Peers: wife or girl friend attempted to influence the respondent against enlisting in the Navy.
- 5) Other Relatives: relative(s) other than mother or father were against the individual's enlisting.
- 6) Separation: the respondent had family commitments or did not want to leave home and so was not interested in joining the Navy.
- 7) Moral Aspects: the respondent viewed the aims of the military as being immoral.
- 8) Danger: individual expressed fear of danger associated with the service because of war or being at sea.

- 9) Loss of Freedom: respondent perceived that discipline in the Navy was generally strict or that he would lose his sense of personal freedom.
- 10) Types of Duty: individual characterized Navy duty as either having little variety or not being transferrable to the civilian sector.
- 11) Length of Enlistment: individual believed that length of time of enlistment was excessive.
- 12) Inability to Quit: inability to separate from service was seen as a negative attribute.
- 13) Recruiter: individual viewed recruiters as being dishonest; respondent had aversive experiences with recruiters of any service.
- 14) Job Goals: respondent had definite job plans in the civilian world.
- 15) Finish Education: individual wished to complete his education at present time.
- 16) Draft: individual's draft number was sufficiently high (or unknown) and did not merit concern.
- 17) Financial: individual was discouraged by low pay of the military service.

A 25% random sample of interview protocols from each sub-group in Study I was independently coded by two members of the research project staff. Inter-coder agreement in assigning protocol elements was 92.6% and 91.3% for the first and second subgroup, respectively.

As an adjunct to the interviews with prospective recruits, interviews were also conducted with a sample of 20 Navy recruiters. This was done in order to obtain a description of the recruiters' view of the recruiting process and the kinds of factors that are perceived by them as motivating men who enlist. These interviews were not used in the development of the career motivation model but were examined for their practical implications, given our findings. The results of these interviews are summarized in Table 4.

Study II - The junior college study. Two samples of junior college students were interviewed as part of this study. The first interview sample

consisted of 20 junior college students who had demonstrated some interest in the Navy by contacting a Navy recruiter during his visit to their college. A second sample consisted of 40 junior college students who had shown no such interest. These samples were selected from junior colleges located throughout Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland. The rationale for selecting a junior college population as a target group was based on several considerations.

First, one may describe the Navy as being "task-oriented" and "technological." It follows that one of the most crucial aspects of the Navy's manpower needs is the capability to attract personnel who have the ability and motivation to work in technical areas.

Second, given the fact that junior colleges--the fastest growing segment of American education--are rapidly assuming a major technical training role in the educational system, it would seem that junior college students represent a worthwhile population for study as a source of qualified enlistees. In support of this approach, it may be noted that Johnston and Bachman (1972) observed that men who have had college experience are severely under-represented in all the military services, and recommended that they be the object of special recruiting campaigns. As a matter of fact, it appeared that this group had not been given much attention by recruiters despite their obvious qualifications. Many of the recruiters expressed discomfort in working with this population. It was clear that they had been neither selected nor prepared for dealing with college students, so that the potential benefits derived from devoting attention to junior college students was not being realized. For these reasons, we felt that the junior college population was particularly appropriate as a target for Navy recruiters. Therefore, Study II was undertaken to establish the extent of interest in the Navy among junior college students. The following kinds of questions were asked of this population:

1. Among junior college students demonstrating some interest in the Navy (by talking to a Navy recruiter), questions were focused on factors that attracted them to the Navy. How have these factors operated to attract them? Why are these factors important? In addition, questions were raised concerning aspects of the Navy that made it unappealing to these individuals.

How did these factors operate to make the Navy unappealing?

2. Among junior college students who showed no interest in the Navy, a similar set of questions were raised. What factors made the Navy unattractive and prevented those men from exploring the Navy? What aspects of the Navy were still appealing to them? How do these positive and negative factors interact?


Given the differences between these two groups in terms of orientation toward the Navy, it was felt that it would be possible to examine both "approach" and "avoidance" factors leading junior college students to consider the Navy as a possible career.

A 25% random sample of interview protocols from Study II were independently coded by two members of the research project staff. Both samples, those interested and not interested in the Navy (as defined by discussion with a recruiter on campus) were included in the random sample because the coding categories were identical. Intercooder agreement in assigning protocol elements was 93.2%.

The positive and negative protocol response categories are the same in this sample as were developed for the interviews of those men who decided not to enlist (Study I).

Results and Interpretations

The approach to analysis and interpretation of the results of these interviews was determined by the underlying dynamic purpose of the study. That purpose was to construct cognitive maps of individuals engaged in the process of deciding whether or not to enlist in the Navy, and from this to generate ideas about how the Navy's recruiting policies and procedures might be changed for the better. For this reason, intensity rather than extensity of sampling governed the interviewing plans. Thus, interpretation is not concentrated heavily upon frequency of citation of each factor among different groups, nor upon the computation of statistical tests. In this dynamic context, frequency of mention is not the only clue to meaning. In some instances, it is possible to gain a critical insight or capture a "good idea" from just one individual. However, the



compilation of descriptive statistics is not without value in making contributions to our exploratory objectives, and is reflected in Tables 1 through 6.

In Table 1 is shown the frequency of citation of those factors which the enlistees (Study I) cited as being important in their decision to enlist. Table 2 shows the positive and Table 3 shows the negative factors affecting the enlistment decision of those men who had contact with the recruiting system, but did not enlist. Table 4 provides data on positive factors affecting enlistment as seen by recruiters. Table 5 lists the positive attributes of the Navy as cited by two junior college subgroups (Study II), while Table 6 lists the frequency of negative attributes mentioned by the individuals in each of these groups.

The data reveal that a number of factors assumed importance in decision processes, including the individual's career interest and goals, the influence of his parents and peers, and his need to mature.

The importance of careers and jobs. On the basis of these results, it would appear that in the eyes of prospective enlistees, the Navy's potential for mediating vocational goal attainment is a most salient characteristic, serving to either attract or repel them. Thus, factors such as education, job training, and job goals seem now to be very important to the individuals who are in a position to consider the Navy as a career option, just as they have been in the past. Examination of Tables 1-6 reveals that:

a) Among those who did enlist, 75% cited job training as an important factor affecting enlistment decisions, while 47% cited educational benefits.

b) Among those who did not enlist, 57% cited limitations of educational benefits as a reason for not enlisting in the Navy, and 40% cited more appealing job goals outside the service. However, 26% cited educational benefits and 37% cited job training as positive factors.

c) Of the junior college students who spoke to a recruiter, 80% cited job training as a positive factor for joining the Navy and 25% cited educational benefits. Similarly, 75% cited the Navy's educational opportunities as incompatible with their own educational goals, while 30% cited Navy career opportunities as incompatible with their career goals.

d) Of those junior college students who were not interested in the Navy, the importance of educational/career goals was great; i.e., 60% cited the need to finish their education and 50% cited other job goals as factors leading them not to enlist in the Navy. Yet 25% cited job training and 17.5% educational benefits as positive attributes of the Navy.

In general, one can summarize these results by stating that the youth interviewed were job and career-oriented. While they may have been affected by some of the currents of change in our society, they find individual responsibility and meaningful work activity important. When we look at what they told us, we find that many interviewees flatly stated that they dislike "busy work;" and they don't like to do something "just because somebody tells me to do it." Moreover, a number said that they dislike "mickey mouse" discipline and "restrictions." They felt very strongly about giving up control over their lives by joining the Navy. However, it is important to emphasize the fact that these youth were career-oriented and work-oriented. Thus, discussions of "the kinds of work I want to do" and statements of interest in different kinds of careers are very much a part of their conversation. There is no rejection of the "work-ethic," as such. In this sense, the construction of the conceptual model of career motivation reflects the fact that the difference between those who are interested in the Navy and those who are not lies in their view of the Navy as a place for satisfying their career/educational goals.

How well-defined are these career/educational goals and what implication does this have for the Navy? There are a number of considerations that seem worthy of note.

First, it is evident that only a few of these individuals have a clear idea of what they would like to do. Most express interest in having a meaningful job, but the frequency of citation of education as an incentive to enlistment suggests that their goals are as yet relatively undifferentiated. One implication to be drawn from this finding is that an extensive vocational counseling program, professionally conducted, could be of considerable value for providing direction and guidance to potential enlistees. As will be seen later, this recommendation is also relevant for influencing reenlistment decision-making. Such a counseling program, if legitimately advertised,

could provide considerable benefit to young men seeking to explore various vocational interests and to develop vocational identity.

The influences of family and friends. There is a good deal of support in the research literature (cf. Van Maanen, 1972) regarding the impact of family and friends on career choice. As Tables 1-6 indicate, Studies I and II also demonstrate that peers and parents are influential in enlistment decision-making:

a) Among those who enlisted, 60% cited male peers, and 49% and 45% cited father and mother, respectively, as being influential in their decision.

b) Among those who did not enlist, 26% cited father and 17% cited male peers as being positive influences. Yet, 31% cited male peers and 14% cited female peers as being negative influences.

c) Of the junior college students who spoke to a recruiter, 45% cited male peers and 20% cited father as positive factors concerning enlistment. However, 35% cited father, 30% cited female peers, and 25% cited mother and male peers as being negative factors.

d) Of those junior college students who were not interested in the Navy, 40% cited male peers and 23% cited father as positive factors. On the other hand, 55% cited male peers, 33% cited mother, and 30% cited father as negative factors.

It is important to note that parents and friends are just as likely to argue against enlistment as to argue in favor of it. However, for the most part, the girl friends of these individuals are by and large not supportive of decisions to enlist in the Navy. The following extracts from interview protocols convey the flavor of peer and parental influence:

Many of his friends who were against the service were against it because of the Vietnam war; they thought we should not have gotten into it, that it was a waste of human life, and that we had no business being there since it is Vietnam's problem. He felt the same way.

He said that his father, who was once in the Coast Guard, would like his joining the service, since his brother had been in the Army and he saw how it had matured him.

TABLE 1

Positive Factors Affecting the Enlistment Decision of Those
Men Who Have Decided to Enlist (Study I)

<u>Navy Factors</u>	<u>Percentage of Individuals Citing as a Factor (Total N=53)</u>
Job Training	75%
Travel	49
Educational Benefits	47
Financial /Security	32
Maturity	28
Sea/Ship Image	24
Draft	19
Guarantees	19
Buddy System	6
Patriotism	4
Military Life Style	2
<u>Personal Influences</u>	
Male Peers	60%
Father	49
Mother	45
Family in Navy	43
Other Relatives	36
Recruiter	18
Female Peers	13

TABLE 2

Positive Factors Affecting the Enlistment Decision of Those
Men Who Have Decided Not to Enlist (Study I)

<u>Navy Factors</u>	<u>Percentage of Individuals Citing as a Factor (Total N=58)</u>
Travel	38%
Job Training	37
Educational Benefits	26
Financial/Security	10
Sea/Ship Image	10
Draft	10
Situational Dissatisfaction	9
Guarantees	7
Maturity	7
Buddy System	5
Military Life Style	3
Patriotism	2
<u>Personal Influences</u>	
Father	26%
Male Peers	17
Family in Navy	17
Mother	10
Other Relatives	10
Recruiter	7
Female Peers	3

TABLE 3

Negative Factors Affecting the Enlistment Decision of Those
Men Who Have Decided Not to Enlist (Study I)

<u>Navy Factors</u>	<u>Percentage of Individuals Citing as a Factor (Total N=58)</u>
Finish Education	57%
Job Goals	40
Length of Enlistment	22
Loss of Freedom	16
Moral Aspects	14
Types of Duty	14
Financial	14
Inability to Quit	7
Danger	5
Separation	3
Draft	0
<u>Personal Influences</u>	
Recruiter	41%
Male Peers	31
Female Peers	14
Other Relatives	14
Father	7
Mother	5

TABLE 4

Positive Factors Affecting Enlistment Decision
as Seen by Recruiters (Study I)

<u>Navy Factors</u>	<u>Percentage of Individuals Citing as a Factor (Total N=20)</u>
Job Training	70%
Educational Benefits	55
Travel	35
Financial/Security	30
Opportunity to Get Away	25
Opportunity to Mature	5
<u>Personal Influences</u>	
Parents	15%
Peers	15
Relatives	5

TABLE 5

Positive Influencing Factors--Junior College Sample (Study II)

<u>Navy Factors</u>	Percent Frequency Cited by Those who saw Naval Recruiter (N=20)	Percent Frequency Cited by Those who did not see Naval Recruiter (N=40)
Job Training	80%	25%
Financial/Security	50	23
Travel	40	30
Draft	30	8
Educational Benefits	25	18
Guarantees	20	0
Maturity	20	15
Sea/Ship Image	10	13
Situational Dissatisfaction	5	3
Patriotism	5	15
Military Life Style	5	0
Buddy System	0	3
<u>Personal Influences</u>		
Male Peers	45%	40%
Father	20	23
Other Relatives	10	8
Family in Navy	5	18
Mother	0	10
Female Peers	0	0
Recruiter	0	0

TABLE 6

Negative Influencing Factors--Junior College Sample (Study II)

<u>Navy Factors</u>	Percent Frequency Cited by Those who saw Naval Recruiter (N=20)	Percent Frequency Cited by Those Naval Recruiter (N=40)
Finish Education	75%	60%
Loss of Freedom	40	45
Length of Enlistment	30	10
Job Goals	30	50
Separation	15	13
Inability to Quit	10	10
Financial	10	8
Moral Aspects	5	30
Danger Aspects	5	18
Types of Duty	5	18
Draft	5	25
<u>Personal Influences</u>		
Father	35%	30%
Female Peers	30	10
Male Peers	25	55
Mother	25	33
Recruiter	5	15
Other Relatives	0	5

His mother and his friends were all against the military because of its link with killing.

He had one friend in the Navy who felt the recruiter had lied to him.

His parents were for his going to school and college, and not joining the military.

One implication of the apparent importance of parents in helping the individual to make an enlistment decision is that as the Navy develops and implements administrative changes under all-volunteer conditions, the nature and extent of such changes should be communicated both to the potential enlistee and his family. In this way, the influence of parental support can be brought to bear on enlistment decision-making. Linked to this is the possibility of giving more attention to appeals aimed at young people before they have reached enlistment age--at ages 15 and 16 let us say--when they are more receptive (as Gilbert Youth Survey results indicate) and while parental influence is still likely to be relatively high. These findings represent an important feature of the career motivation model vis-a-vis factors affecting enlistment decisions.

Image of the Navy. Another significant factor influencing enlistment decisions is the overall image of the Navy. That is, the images of far-away places and of travel and of going to sea were very much part of the cognitive map described by interviewees. Moreover, these images were almost always viewed favorably. Approximately 30% to 50% of our subgroups of young men, including those not disposed to enlist, cited such images as a favorable aspect of the Navy. Similarly, the negative aspects of going to sea (i.e., being separated from one's family) were infrequently cited by these men (Tables 3 and 6).

As Tables 1, 2 and 5 show:

- a) Among those who enlisted, 49% cited travel as being influential in their decision.
- b) Among those who did not enlist, 38% cited travel as being a positive

feature of the Navy. Only 3% mentioned separation as being a negative aspect.

c) Of the junior college students who spoke to a recruiter, 40% said that travel was a positive factor; only 15% said that separation was a negative factor.

d) Of the junior college students who were not interested in the Navy, 30% cited travel as being a positive influence, while only 13% saw separation from family and friends as being a negative influence.

Infrequent citation of separation is not unexpected as few interviewees had personal family responsibilities and had little idea of the impact that separation from family and friends might have. Furthermore, most young men are likely to view an opportunity to loosen parental ties and strike out on their own as desirable aspects for developing maturation and an independent spirit. In total, it would appear that traditional appeals of the Navy are still relevant today, and are thus included in our model of career motivation.

There are some additional points regarding travel as an appeal that should be kept in mind. The very meaning of travel may now be quite different from what it was some years ago. Thus, "travel" for the person already in the Navy is sometimes a source of discontentment (as will be documented later). The opportunity to go to a foreign country may not be very satisfying if: a) the place being visited isn't very interesting, and/or b) one has to be back on ship every night, and/or c) one is received poorly (e.g., cheated) by local townspeople. In essence, it might be suggested that yes, "travel" and the "glamour of the sea" are still meaningful incentives for enlisting, yet when travel expectations are not adequately met in the Navy, the result may be frustration, rather than satisfaction, with concomitant negative implications for career motivation.

Travel also takes on a different meaning when one considers that today's youth are much more mobile than they were years ago. Nowadays, more than in the past, many youths are likely to have traveled extensively by the time they reach their late teens and are eligible for enlistment in the service. That being the case, travel is not quite as attractive as it may have been in the past, although it still retains much of its former appeal.

The urge to mature as a "man." Traditionally, the military services have projected an image of "firmness," "discipline," and "manliness." As incorporated in the career motivation model, these are images that have enabled the Navy to attract individuals who: a) are desirous of maturing and b) feel that they need traditional military discipline and structure to attain maturity. For example, our interviewees made comments like: "I liked the idea of discipline;" "It would make me a better person;" "A big reason for joining would be maturing;" "The discipline would be good for me." The data show that the potential to mature in the Navy was appealing to a substantial proportion of respondents, but more so to those who expressed some interest in the Navy. Tables 1, 2 and 5 show that:

- a) Among those who enlisted, 28% cited the opportunity to mature as being influential in their enlistment decision.
- b) Among those junior college students who spoke to a recruiter, 20% cited this as an influential factor.
- c) Among those who did not enlist or among the junior college students who did not express interest in the Navy, this factor did not play a very big part, citation being 7% and 15%, respectively.

The "moral" issue. As a final factor affecting enlistment decisions, some interviewees raised moral issues regarding the role of the military in society. This issue of the morality of the military belongs in the career motivation model insofar as it influences whether individuals decide to enlist or not. The moral and ethical questions raised by some individuals constituted sufficient cause for them to view a Navy career as unappealing. Moral indignation over the conduct of the Vietnam war and the role of the military was not universal; however, as Tables 3 and 6 show:

- a) Among those deciding not to enlist, 14% cited moral aspects as a deterrent to enlist.
- b) Among junior college students not interested in the Navy, 30% cited moral aspects as a negative factor.
- c) Among junior college students who spoke to a recruiter, only 5% cited moral aspects as a negative influence.

Thus, concern over moral issues is centered mainly among those expressing no interest in the Navy, especially among junior college students lacking interest. While the percentages are worth noting, however, they are not overwhelming. Moreover, the Vietnam war was most often mentioned in terms of its practical and concrete implications for the safety of individuals enlisting in the military. When viewed in light of other factors leading men not to enlist, it would be most appropriate to conclude that for the most part men objected to the Navy in terms of what the Navy meant to them as an organization in which to live, work and pursue a career rather than because of the Navy's role in Vietnam, moral or otherwise. It must also be remembered that these data were collected at a point in time prior to the Vietnam ceasefire and the termination of active U.S. involvement in combat.

THE REENLISTMENT STUDY

There are two complementary approaches for developing an able, motivated work force in any organization. The first of these is to attract a sufficient number of qualified individuals. Implementing such an approach implies that attention ought to be focused on problems encountered in recruiting. A second approach involves examining the policies, practices and leadership system, as well as socialization processes operating in the organization. The latter approach entails an examination of the manner by which the organization encourages or discourages the development of career motivation. A considerable portion of our career motivation model is devoted to specifying attributes of the Navy and, types of organizational variables that influence career motivation, once the individual has enlisted. More specifically, we have investigated the manner by which the Navy influences career motivation of an individual who is also subjected to societal influences and socialization processes.

Method

The data leading to formulation of the career motivation model were collected by depth interviews conducted with Navy enlisted personnel in three critical ratings, at different stages in their first enlistment. The three critical ratings consisted of ET (Electronics Technician), HT (Hull Technician) and EN (Engineman). The different stages of enlistment consisted of six to seven weeks of time in service (recruit training), six to twelve months, twenty-two to twenty-six months, and thirty-nine to forty-five months. With the exception of the group in recruit training, all interviews were conducted at Norfolk Naval Base and Little Creek Amphibious Base. Recruits were interviewed at the Recruit Training Center, San Diego, California. The number of individuals interviewed in different subgroups are shown as follows:

Time in the Navy

	*Recruits <u>6-7 Wks.</u>	<u>6-12 Mos.</u>	<u>22-26 Mos.</u>	<u>39-45 Mos.</u>	<u>Total</u>
ET's (Electronics Technicians)	5	5	5	5	20
EN's (Enginemen)	5	5	5	5	20
HT's (Hull Technicians)	5	5	5	5	20
Total	15	15	15	15	60

* Selected for Class A Schools.

Interviewees were selected on a random basis from those personnel available at each location. There were two restrictions to random selection. First, the men were those who had been designated for school training, or petty officers in one of the three rates involved. Second, each was to have enlisted for at least a four year tour of duty. With the exception of several ETs who had signed up for six years, all interviewees had contracted for four years of Navy service.

The rationale behind selection of these three rates and the four different time periods was based upon the Navy's need for personnel in specific job classifications, as well as previous research on career motivation. The three rates chosen were among those in current or prospective short supply in the Navy, as reported in conversations with BuPers officials concerned with manpower requirements, and they represented rather different kinds of duties and personnel qualification requirements. These rates were also those for which high Variable Reenlistment Bonuses were paid. The different lengths of service were selected on the basis of previous research (Glickman, 1961) indicating these time periods were key points in the development of career motivation.

Figure 3 is a graphic summary of that study, resulting from administration of the instrument to similar groups of sailors at eight different




Figure 3. Career Motivation Survey

stages of the first enlistment. The reenlistment and uncertainty indices shown are percentages of respondents indicating that they wanted to reenlist or had not as yet made a decision one way or the other. This earlier work demonstrated that interest in a Navy career declined sharply as men progressed from recruit training through the first six to twelve months of duty. In the third year their reenlistment interest reached a low point and then rose again as men neared the end of their first enlistment.

Interview procedures. At the beginning, the interviewer explained the purpose of the interview and gave the respondent assurance of confidentiality. Little problem was encountered in terms of establishing rapport with respondents as evidenced by the frankness of their remarks concerning their current situations. As in Studies I and II, the interview procedures were flexible and open-ended to allow the interviewee to answer questions and raise issues as he saw fit.

The interview was designed to elicit perceptions and views of the enlisted man regarding his planning for a long-term career. We were specifically concerned with the kinds of factors that affected his decision to either stay in the Navy or seek opportunities elsewhere. While the questions were not in a strictly prearranged format (see Interview Guide shown in Appendix A), the interview typically covered a range of topics that included questions about the recruiter, job satisfaction and pay, and the kinds of leadership encountered. The interviewer's goal was to examine these factors in an exhaustive fashion. He was not inclined to accept the first answer given by the respondent--rather, he would probe deeply to find out how important a given factor was and whether any other factors also played a role in the interviewer's career decision-making.

Following each interview, a protocol was prepared from notes taken by the interviewer. Scoring criteria were then developed and each protocol was coded independently. Reliability of coding was established by computing a percent agreement score among three raters for a 45% sample of the sixty interviews. The interrater agreement was 89.3%, thereby indicating that our coding process was sufficiently reliable.

Results and Interpretations

In overall terms, the interviews revealed that reenlistment interest declined in a near geometric fashion over the course of the four year

enlistment, as shown in Table 7. Hence, of the sixty men interviewed, eight of fifteen recruits were at least considering the possibility of reenlisting. Among men with more time in service, only four of those with 6 to 12 months of service were open to the possibility of reenlisting, three of those with 22-26 months felt as though reenlisting was a distinct possibility, while only one of those who had served for 39-45 months was willing to reenlist.

The data gathered from these interviews are summarized in Tables 7, 8 and 9, and reflect a number of important influences on the development of career motivation. Insofar as these data were used to derive the model of career motivation illustrated in Figures 2a, b, and c, the discussion of results will focus on the implications of these data for understanding the development of career motivation.

The following is a list of definitions for the positive response categories developed:

- 1) Training: he wanted to reenlist because the Navy trained him to do a job that he enjoyed.
- 2) Security: job security found in the Navy appealed to the respondent.
- 3) Travel: the idea of travel appealed to the respondent.
- 4) Pay and Benefits: pay and benefits of the Navy made it seem attractive to the respondent.

The following is a list of definitions for the negative response categories developed:

- 1) Separation: the respondent had home commitments he did not want to leave, so he was not interested in reenlisting.
- 2) Loss of Freedom: respondent thought discipline in the Navy was too strict and that he lost his personal freedom.
- 3) Unmet Expectations: the respondent did not want to reenlist because he thought he was lied to by his recruiter and/or due to broken promises by the Navy.
- 4) Leaders and Disorganization: The respondent was discouraged from reenlisting because of disorganization of the Navy, or due to being told how to do work by leaders who did not know how themselves.

TABLE 7

Reenlistment Intention of Men (ET's, HT's, EN's) at Four
Different Periods of Enlistment

<u>Time in Service</u>	<u>Number of Men Considering Reenlistment</u>	<u>Percentage of Men Considering Reenlistment</u>
6 - 7 weeks (N=15)	8	53%
6 - 12 months (N=15)	4	27
22 - 26 months (N=15)	3	20
39 - 45 months (N=15)	1	7

TABLE 8

Positive Factors Affecting the Reenlistment Decision of ET's, HT's, and EN's
in their 6th to 45th Month of Service

Positive Factors	% of Individuals 6-12 Months in Service Citing as a Factor (N=15)	% of Individuals 22-26 Months in Service Citing as a Factor (N=15)	% of Individuals 39-45 Months in Service Citing as a Factor (N=15)	% of Total Individuals Citing as a Factor (N=45)
Training	40%	47%	20%	36%
Security	13	13	13	13
Travel	13	7	13	11
Pay & Benefits	13	13	7	11

TABLE 9

Negative Factors Affecting the Reenlistment Decision of ET's, HT's, and EN's
in their 6th to 45th Month of Service

Negative Factors	% of Individuals 6-12 Months in Service Citing as a Factor (N=15)	% of Individuals 22-26 Months in Service Citing as a Factor (N=15)	% of Individuals 39-45 Months in Service Citing as a Factor (N=15)	% of Total Individuals Citing as a Factor (N=45)
Separation	47%	80%	67%	64%
Loss of Freedom	60	40	53	51
Unmet Expectations	67	47	40	51
Leaders & Disorganization	33	27	67	42
Inequitable Treatment	47	27	40	38
Busy Work	40	33	33	36
Long Hours/Low Pay	33	33	33	33
Useless Training	20	40	27	29
Favoritism to Higher Rank	27	33	7	22

- 5) Inequitable Treatment: reenlistment avoidance due to individual commanders interpreting policies such as Z-grams differently, or because the respondent's rate had to put in longer hours or got fewer privileges than other rates.
- 6) Busy Work: respondent was bored with work and/or had to look busy even if nothing needed to be done.
- 7) Long Hours/Low Pay: respondent did not want to reenlist because of long hours and/or low pay of the Navy.
- 8) Useless Training: respondent did not want to reenlist because he engaged in work unrelated to his training, or his training was useless in the civilian world.
- 9) Favoritism to Higher Rank: reenlistment avoidance by the respondent because of special privileges given higher-ranked men (as well as overlooking of their violation of regulations), special housing, etc.

The recruiter as an influence. Perhaps the most pervasive factor appearing in the interviews with enlisted men was the feeling that they were in a system where they had little power to control their own fate. The perception of "powerlessness" was viewed as making it nearly impossible for the individual to circumvent adverse situations, correct earlier "mistakes," or change one's career course. As included in the career motivation model, "powerlessness" is not just an outcome of the various experiences, but also conditions leading to selective retrospection or "rewriting of history" (i.e., attitudinal and cognitive readjustment serving to justify negative feelings, as described by Bem, 1967, and Festinger, 1957). Once these negative feelings develop and are substantiated by cognitive adjustments, the outcome is a lessening of career motivation (or less interest in reenlisting as defined here).

One of the key problem areas uncovered in the interviews concerns the extent to which expectations of enlisted men are not met. Specifically, these data reflect the establishment of unrealistic expectations by the recruiter and other socialization agents. Thus, examining Table 9, it may be seen that about 50% of the men in our sample felt that there was a serious discrepancy between what they thought would happen in the Navy and what they actually experienced. Unfortunately common were statements such as those by one EN who felt that everything that he had been told was a lie. The recruiter

had promised him a choice of schools and a choice of location, neither of which he received. He is now in a rating he did not want, and though he had indicated that he wanted to be stationed on the West Coast, he is now on the East Coast. The most depressing aspect of the situation and an important determinant of his desire to get out of the Navy, is the fact that there is no one in whom he feels he can confide and receive help. As he put it, "Everyone either doesn't give a damn or else they are afraid to do anything on their own, so they pass the buck."

What happened? Did the recruiter lie? Has the interviewee distorted what the recruiter said to justify his negative feelings? Our data do not allow us to choose among these explanations. If we assume, however, that both kinds of explanations have some degree of validity, a number of implications might be drawn. When broken promises are those that have been made by the recruiter, they assume great significance due to their occurrence early in the enlistment. These initial broken promises color perceptions of later events. For example, if the recruiter had promised the applicant (or even suggested) a particular school after completing recruit training and, for one reason or another, the applicant does not receive this training, the effect of such unmet expectations is felt throughout the rest of the tour. Clearly, people's expectations cannot always be met. If there have been a series of events where expectations have been fulfilled and trust has been established between the two parties, unmet expectations occur early in the enlistment, the negative impact is magnified since there is little reason for the individual to view such incidents as being "unusual." This situation is further exacerbated when the enlisted man feels that there is nothing he can do about his situation, and there is no one he can turn to for help.

It is apparent from the interviews that the recruiter managed to fully describe positive benefits of Navy life, while neglecting to inform men of problems to be faced. Thus, one person indicated that "boot" camp would not have been as bad as it was if he had been prepared for it. However, he was not prepared and he feels the recruiter was at least partially to blame for a very negative experience.

A final implication of widespread unmet expectations and perceived powerlessness is reflected by the image of the Navy as portrayed by interviewees. This image takes such form as: a) "You can't trust the Navy;" b) "They put you in schools you didn't expect to go to;" c) "They decide where you go and what you do, and you have little say in the matter." This image implies that the enlisted man feels that the Navy has little interest in his needs, yet there is nothing he can do about it.

The leadership system over-all. The perception of powerlessness also seems to pervade many other areas of Navy life. In general terms, this powerlessness may in part be attributed to the relationship maintained between the enlisted man and the authority system. One can raise several questions concerning authority-subordinate relations in the Navy. For example, to what extent are enlisted men allowed autonomy? Are they permitted to control their own fate as much as possible within the limits of realistic assessment of operational requirements? Are they encouraged to exercise skills and competencies along lines of their own interests and unique training? To what extent is the leadership system devoted to establishing its power over subordinates? To what extent do leaders assign tasks and impose stringent demands to remind the enlisted man of his "place" in the hierarchial system? To what extent does the individual enlisted man experience this sort of leadership? How does the enlisted man incorporate such experiences to reinforce beliefs regarding his own powerlessness and his lack of ability to control his own fate? Are assumptions and conventions guiding leadership behavior in the Navy in need of reexamination and revision to make them more appropriate to contemporary values, present conditions and the backgrounds of today's youth? The behavioral implications of the nature of superior subordinate relationships are relatively pervasive and for this reason have been incorporated into the career motivation model.

Enlisted men described the leadership system in various ways, some positive and some negative. For example, there was one interviewee who stated that Navy leaders were intent upon achieving constructive goals. Another interviewee cited the fact that his supervisor was very much concerned with insuring that rewards for good work were immediately available. A third interviewee cited the fact that he had always been left

pretty much alone and that he had not been "hassled." However, relatively favorable comments tended to be in the minority. Common were complaints regarding four particular attributes of Navy leaders. The first of these concerned the general inconsistencies and contradictions afflicting the leadership system. As a number of men put it, "The left hand never knows what the right is doing." Second, problems centered around leaders who "don't know anything, but try to tell you what to do anyway." Third, there were many complaints about "pettiness" and the use of power for its own sake. Finally, many men mentioned that there were leaders who lied to you, broke their promises, and manipulated you for their own ends.

Related to such inconsistencies in the leadership system are several illustrative comments. One person commented that the plan of the day was changed several times during the day so that no one knew what was going on. Another enlisted man thought that his CO ignored Z-grams. The variations in planning and procedure carried out by different chiefs was mentioned by another interviewee who said that you never knew what was coming next. Further inconsistencies were cited to exist among officers in the same command. One interviewee, discussing arbitrary interpretation of Z-grams, suggested that inconsistencies in regulations led to perceptions that there is no clear-cut way to get ahead.

In general, Z-grams were viewed rather positively as a legitimate attempt by Admiral Zumwalt to meet the needs of enlisted personnel. However, the Z-grams often serve to enhance the men's expectations of change in the Navy, which unfortunately, from the enlisted men's point of view, has not materialized. Thus, men express the feeling that Z-grams are promising but that they only serve to increase the perception of discrepancy among leaders. That is, one officer may implement Z-gram recommendations, while another officer does not. This discrepancy is further increased when the sailor views this behavior on the part of his officers as aiming to subvert the wishes of higher authority.

Simply put, the inconsistency found among Navy leaders only serves to confuse the men and leads them to view their leaders as being incompetent. As stated tersely by one enlisted man, "Navy leaders can't seem to get it together in one sock."

Another problem associated with leadership is the fact that officers often attempt to use their direct technical authority without having technical knowledge. An outcome resulting from such leader behaviors is typically an antagonistic subordinate who views his leaders with contempt.

As a result of such perceptions of leader behaviors, enlisted men come to regard their officers as not having "expert power" (as defined by French & Raven, 1959). This perception undermines one basis on which the officer might be able to influence his men. In addition, this perception of the leader as being a non-expert also generalizes to other areas, such that the enlisted man views his leaders as lacking in legitimacy (or legitimate power). Naturally, erosion of the leader's perceived powers has negative consequences, both in terms of the enlisted man's career motivation and his responsiveness to authority.

Taken together with previously noted problems relating to unmet expectations and loss of personal freedom, the difficulties enlisted men encounter with leaders simply serve to worsen an already difficult situation. By themselves, the perceived inconsistency among leaders and the lack of technical expertise among officers might not have such negative consequence, might be accepted with more tolerance of human frailty, were it not for the fact that such leadership problems take place within the context of perceived unmet expectations and loss of personal freedom.

Job and task assignments. Jobs and duties in the Navy also serve to generate negative affect toward the organization. While there may be other factors aside from work that are important to the individual in affecting how he feels about the Navy as a career, the jobs and tasks in which he is engaged are unquestionably of considerable salience. What do the interviews tell us about how the first-termers come to view his tasks and his job and what implications does this have for the career motivation model?

In one respect, the information we obtained indicated that men favorably evaluated Navy jobs and training. About one-third of individuals in three rating groups cited training and work as a favorable aspect of their Navy experience. This was by far the most frequently cited favorable factor. However, more than a third of the same groups expressed anger and dismay

at being forced to engage in boring, repetitive work having little significance and little apparent meaning.

As long as the individual is allowed to engage in those behaviors which are really a manifestation of himself (i.e., his career and the work he is trained to do), the general over-all affect is positive. However, when the individual is reminded that he is at the bottom of an authoritarian hierarchial system (i.e., when he is given meaningless, repetitious tasks to do, and he is given no reasonable explanation of why he has to do them), negative affect results. This sort of situation pushes the enlisted man to view the Navy as an all-controlling mechanism that is not as responsive to his needs as it could be. Negative perceptions of the Navy are magnified further when the individual considers that his leaders are unconcerned with achievement. In light of the enlisted man's expectation that the Navy is task and achievement-oriented, the nature of his work and task assignments tends to disconfirm these early expectancies.

It is interesting to note that a recent study (Baxter, 1973) performed by AIR in an industrial setting showed similar results concerning unmet expectations leading to job dissatisfaction. It was found that the greatest frustration of workers under 25 concerns the work itself, its relative lack of challenge, and the workers not being consulted about their own ideas. Pay, security, and the people they work with are not seen to be nearly as important. Further, high school graduates were found to be the least satisfied workers, while those with the most and least education were the most satisfied.

The principle of equity as an influence. Equity-seeking is a basic psychological principle (cf. Adams, 1965), such that people learn early in life that equity is "just" and is the "natural order of things," and that "people get what they deserve." It is also well-supported that when equity is not achieved (Adams & Rosenbaum, 1962) the result is dissatisfaction, and a desire to withdraw from the situation. Thus, to the extent that the Navy is perceived as not providing for equitable rewards, enlisted men view the organization in a negative fashion.

Given these behavioral implications of inequity, it is not surprising that much importance was attached to inequities by some of our interviewees. Frequently (in about one-third of the cases), inequities were perceived in terms of the amount and kind of work assigned, and the extent of rewards. Moreover, it was felt that leading petty officers got most of the rewards, and that this was not always justified. Further, some divisions were perceived as having more liberty than others. Insofar as attention is paid to the basic principle of "equity" in our society and the fact that inequities are perceived as existing in the Navy, this factor has been included insofar as it leads to negative affect.

Family separation as an influence. One of the most significant manifestations of the "lack of freedom" in the Navy is the difficulty many men experience in planning and maintaining a meaningful family life. As a number of enlisted men stated it, "A Navy career is not compatible with having a family life." This problem was cited by both married men and single men who were thinking of getting married. Men who observed the effect of family separation among their peers also viewed family separation as a problem, in that it prevented them from considering getting married until they left the Navy. Overall, about one-half of the interviewees cited family separation as a factor leading them to want to leave the Navy. It was the feeling among interviewees that it was not possible to lead a "normal" life in the Navy ("normal" being defined as home, family and kids). Naturally, these feelings were likely to be reinforced by wives and girlfriends. Typically the wives and girlfriends of these men wanted them to leave the Navy at the earliest opportunity. For the most part, family life was one of their main concerns, and they viewed a Navy career as incompatible with satisfactory family life.

While the fact that married men are less interested in a Navy career than single men is not a new finding in the literature on career motivation (cf. Kinkade, 1968; Baker & Sieger, 1969). However, there is little research (aside from the data presented here) suggesting that single men view restrictions on family life as a deterrent to a Navy career.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As aforementioned, recent changes to an all-volunteer military service have resulted in numerous problems related to the acquisition and retention of qualified personnel in the Navy. While our research has identified a number of problem areas and important determinants of these problems, there is a clear need to examine means by which such difficulties can be alleviated and personnel and management systems can be improved. As an outcome of our research, we have developed a number of recommendations that might be implemented to reduce difficulties associated with manpower accession and retention. We have attempted to design recommended changes in such a way as to be operationally feasible as well as psychologically sound. These proposals are rooted in the conceptual model of career motivation outlined in this report, and it is our belief that recommended changes could be initially implemented on a limited basis as administrative experiments. Evaluation and further refinement of these suggested changes might then be implemented on a more widespread basis to provide for long-range follow-up of results and transition to implementation.

A key factor in the career motivation of a substantial number of enlisted men is that from the very beginning of their enlistment they come to perceive that they lack "fate control" (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) over important decisions affecting their existence. In the past, relatively little deliberate attention and response has been given by the Navy to "fate control" concepts. It has been more or less taken for granted that the exigencies of military service leave little room for modification of the Navy's organizational practices to alter the image in terms of more flexible decision-making, initiative-taking and individual participation. Emphasis has been upon providing tangible compensatory incentives and rewards to offset these "inevitable" constraints more than upon seeking workable possibilities for organizational modification.

As the differences between military and civilian life narrow in terms of pay, benefits and codes of justice, compulsion associated with the "enlistment contract" is likely to increase in salience. Other things equal, if a

man does not like a civilian job he can "get out," but in the military service he is "locked in" for the duration of his enlistment contract. This constraint is perhaps most accentuated in the sea-going Navy, where men are restricted to the same physical and social environment and round-the-clock demands for extended periods of time. While feelings of actual powerlessness or the threat of "being trapped" are not universal, they do affect a large number of prospective applicants for Navy programs, as well as men who are already enlisted. For the prospective applicant, such feelings lead him to decide not to enlist, nor even to explore the possibility of enlisting in the Navy. In the case of the man serving in his first tour of duty, such feelings lead him not to reenlist. Thus, the result of not being able to control one's fate is a lessening of career motivation. We see fate control as a thematic overlay covering a large part of the cognitive map of career motivation. Many of these recommendations are therefore directed at altering civilians' images of the Navy, so as to increase their perceptions of the degree of fate control possessed by an individual after he joins the Navy. This demands that the Navy make an accurate determination of imperative requirements setting boundaries within which individual and organizational behavior may be modified. Then can follow a realistic determination of the personal and organizational options that can be exchanged between the individual and the Navy within those constraints.

Innovations Affecting Recruiting

At the very beginning of the decision-making process where people are thinking about enlisting, potential applicants are hesitant to approach a recruiter and are quite skeptical in their dealings with him, primarily because they do not wish to be "trapped" or "locked in" to a situation over which they have limited control. On the one hand they do not have much solid information regarding their own capabilities, interests and opportunities; they are not confident of their ability to make a correct decision--one that will hold up over time under a new, vague, ambiguous, uncertain set of circumstances. On the other hand, they put no great trust in the recruiter--a stranger with presumed vested interests. In any event, they are likely to feel that the risk of a "mistake" is high, and regardless of whether or not the mistake can ultimately be blamed on one's self or the recruiter, what is

once done cannot be undone--the consequences of a mistake are immutable in the Navy system; one is stuck with it.

Skepticism of the recruiter is usually rooted in a number of pre-conceptions (in part based on fact and in part based on heresay) regarding the role, methods, and motives underlying the recruiter's behavior. This deficiency in credibility is not unknown to the recruiters themselves, who succinctly described the applicant's view of them as "bounty hunters." Thus, the recruiter is perceived to be more interested in filling quotas than with the needs of the individual applicant, and from the applicant's point of view these motives and attendant behaviors of the recruiter lead him to feel that by enlisting he will place himself in a situation where he has little "fate control." Naturally, such a circumstance is seen as aversive by the applicant and to be avoided if possible.

Aside from suspicion engendered by the recruiter's concern with organizational rather than individual priorities, the applicant also suffers from the fact that he has little information about Navy programs and opportunities. Insofar as the applicant does not have other authoritative sources of information to which he can turn, he is forced to rely on information provided to him by the recruiter, an individual he does not particularly trust. Because he lacks information about the Navy, the applicant is quite fearful about the possibility of making a "mistake" while deciding to enlist and selecting a career field. He is, of course, aware that if he selects the wrong career field, he will be committed to it from three to six years. Hence, errors in decision-making are quite costly.

What can the Navy do to reduce the uncertainties inherent in the enlistment situation, while at the same time appealing to a wider range of qualified applicants? In our view there are a number of operational steps that conceivably can be taken to lessen the prospect's anxieties associated with committing himself to the Navy. It might be anticipated that by reducing fears associated with enlistment the number of individuals inclined to enlist might be appreciably raised. Since well-educated applicants are perhaps the most sensitive to anxieties related to enlisting and have more alternatives open to them, reduction of the fear of "being trapped" might

have the greatest impact on the most qualified personnel, who otherwise would not consider a Navy career.

In a recruiting framework there are three particular steps that the Navy might undertake: the development of a career behavior information system, the implementation of a vocational counseling program, and the placing of more effort on appealing to prospects in groups not now being given a great deal of attention, such as junior college students and younger high school students (ages 15-16). All of these approaches seem feasible from an operational standpoint and could be implemented in the beginning on a limited basis as administrative experiments in which the effects of such changes could be evaluated both in outcome and cost-benefit terms.

A career behavior information system. Given the fact that most potential applicants know little about available careers in the Navy, this lack of information alone may lead individuals to ignore the Navy as an option in career decision-making.

While there is a great deal of information available regarding Navy careers in both the Bureau of Naval Personnel and the Navy Recruiting Command, much of this information is primarily concerned with educational/background requirements for specific Navy specialties, the kinds of training applicants will receive and how much time they must invest to enroll in different career programs. Despite the availability of this information, it would appear that there are a number of practical aspects of these career options that are not presently available to applicants for Navy programs (i.e., what sorts of people they interact with, how much prestige is associated with different jobs, behavioral characteristics of the working environment, relevance of Navy training for civilian life). These characteristics would probably be quite useful for applicants to have at their fingertips when they make decisions regarding enlistment and choice of a path for Navy career development. Unfortunately, this information is not available in any formal sense and recruiters and ex-servicemen may provide applicants with this information only in passing. Thus, there is a need to supply applicants and potential applicants with more precise information regarding the nature of Navy jobs and career potentialities.

In order to accomplish this, we propose that the Navy develop a career behavior information system that would describe specific Navy jobs in terms of their behavioral characteristics and career potential, both in and out of the Navy. Similar systems have been designed and used in large civilian organizations (e.g., the system in operation at IBM) and there is no apparent reason why Navy careers could not be described in similar behavioral terms. In order to develop this system either petty officers or non-rated men could describe the behavioral characteristics of their specialties (avoiding technical aspects). These characteristics could then be compiled to develop profiles for each rate, which could then be supplied to applicants to provide them with more complete information on which to make a career choice. Where possible, the profile could include already existing objective data.

The dimensions along which Navy jobs might be described could include the following:

- a) How much time is spent interacting with other personnel (differentiated in terms of amount of time in given types of situations spent interacting with officers, other enlisted men, civilian technical representatives, etc.)?
- b) To what extent would the job require supervision of others and how would the extent of supervision be expected to vary over time?
- c) To what degree does the job involve the development of unique solutions to problems?
- d) What are conditions typical for locations where such jobs are available?
- e) What kinds of tools or equipment are used?
- f) If the job requires shipboard location, what area of the ship would be involved, and what are the working conditions?
- g) What are hazards and safety factors associated with the job?

Developing this sort of information system would have a number of benefits:

- a) Making such information available would reduce some of the ambiguities associated with deciding on a career path. The fact that this information is available might bring a number of otherwise uninterested individuals to explore career possibilities in the Navy.
- b) Assuming that this information would be used by individuals to aid in career decision-making, such information would enable applicants to make more accurate decisions, thereby reducing the likelihood of future job dissatisfaction. Moreover, the availability of this sort of information would decrease the possibility that applicants would develop unrealistic expectations regarding job opportunities and conditions. Overall, there would be less potential for expectancy disconfirmation.
- c) Individuals would be more inclined to enlist, as they find out that "you really do learn something in the Navy" and how the Navy skills are transferable to civilian occupations.
- d) This information could be made available to recruiters as well as school guidance counselors to provide job decision-making information on as wide a basis as possible. The availability of such an information system to the counselor would be of especial value, as a recent study (Johnston & Bachman, 1972) found that the average high school male spends one-half hour with his guidance counselor discussing military service.
- e) The nature of the career behavior information system would be such that it could be coupled with current recruiting appeals in the media. Thus, the fact that specific jobs have particular behavioral characteristics could be publicized and could conceivably increase the appeal of such jobs for potential applicants.

It might be noted that our recommendation regarding the development of a career behavior information system is consistent with recent recommendations by other Office of Naval Research contractors (Brown & Callahan, 1973), who proposed that Navy career information be made available through the schools. These contractors also provided guidelines for the development of career information materials, which include a copious amount of information pertinent to each rating. The career behavior information system that is here proposed would be an additional, useful, independent tool for the potential recruit who is looking for fast but comprehensive behavioral sketches of various jobs to which he might fit himself. Our own data suggest that such approaches will have beneficial outcomes for both the Navy and potential applicants for Navy programs.

Enlistment counseling. As mentioned earlier, most applicants do not have confidence in the recruiter while at the same time, they have no specific career direction. Furthermore, applicants are unaware of the actual range of options available to them in the Navy. One solution to some of these problems that seems operationally feasible is to provide applicants with professional vocational counseling in order to assess their personal needs and capabilities as well as informing them of options available in the Navy. This counseling could be combined with career behavior information to enable him to make a more confident and satisfying career decision.

The counseling program could be established within the framework of the existing recruiting network, such that applicants would first present themselves to the recruiter as they ordinarily do. Following some initial discussion with the recruiter and after providing the usual biographical data and taking the tests now in use, the applicant would be offered the option of going to a professional vocational counselor who would review the entire situation with the applicant, discussing his capabilities in terms of both civilian and Navy work, immediate and long term. Following counseling, the applicant could then return to the recruiter to finalize and implement his decision.

A distinction should be made between the role of the recruiter and that of the vocational counselor in this framework. The recruiter's job has been to match the applicant with available Navy jobs, so that manpower resources are allocated appropriately in phase with changing needs of the service. The role implies that the recruiter is more concerned with the organizational goals of the Navy rather than the goals of specific applicants. The counselor on the other hand, is seen as primarily concerned with the needs and goals of the prospect (i.e., client) and thus, he focuses on ways in which the individual can maximize his potential and growth through selection of an appropriate job or career path in the Navy or elsewhere. Naturally, the counselor is not primarily concerned with the ranges of jobs immediately available in the Navy--rather his aim is to help the applicant select job or training alternatives that are most appropriate regardless of their immediate availability. Of course, the counselors would review information relevant to Navy as well as non-Navy alternatives, along with possible relationships among them.

Given that the role of the recruiter and that of the counselor are quite different, it would seem most appropriate when establishing a counseling system to allow the counselor to remain independent of the recruiter. While the counselor and the recruiter should interact, collaborate and compare notes, their differing roles, training and aims would necessitate their working independently.

Implementing a vocational counseling program for Navy applicants would appear to have a number of benefits. First, the fact that vocational counseling is desirable might make it more likely that a greater proportion of individuals would expose themselves to a recruiter in order to obtain such counseling. While all such applicants would not join the Navy, if more of them are exploring the Navy it is likely that, in absolute terms, larger numbers would eventually enlist. As pointed out in earlier discussion, an important barrier to overcome is that of getting men to begin considering the Navy. The introduction of a counseling program might lead more men to take the Navy into consideration as a career option.

A second implication of the counseling program is that, taken together with the career behavior information system, it would result in more satisfying career choices for the individual. Thus, the likelihood of an enlistee selecting the "wrong speciality is lessened and long-term favorable consequences would be expected in job and career satisfaction.

Third, the counseling program would serve to reduce the fear and anxiety associated with making career decisions. Thus, the applicant would not always deal with a recruiter, whom he may regard somewhat suspiciously. Instead, he has the opportunity to discuss his career with a trained vocational counselor who can bring to bear his training and experience (and the credibility attending professional status) on the applicant's unique needs and qualifications. In essence, the potential enlistee is less likely to feel that he is faced with a system that is primarily concerned with meeting organizational goals, and only incidentally concerned with individual considerations. Rather, he would be exposed to an individual who would be able to supply authoritative information, while at the same time being concerned with him as an individual. He may be expected to feel that he was more fully engaged in making his own deliberate, unpressured choice, and thus accept it more fully thereafter.

Fourth, the introduction of a counseling program would serve to develop an image of the Navy that is considerably different from that held at present. That is, the Navy would be viewed as being interested in individuals, rather than "bodies" to fill quotas. As the word got out, the net result should be an increase in the number of qualified people who would seriously consider joining the Navy--an expansion of the prospect pool. We would also suggest that by offering vocational counseling, the Navy would be appealing to the parents as well as the youth. Many parents bemoan the fact that adolescents lack a sense of direction and are unable to "find themselves." Vocational counseling would be of interest to such parents, who, in turn, might be more disposed to exercise indirect or direct influence upon their sons in favor of the Navy, or at least toward availing themselves of the free counseling service. As we have described in the career motivation model, parents and peers do represent key influences in the decision to enlist.

The overall result of implementing a career behavioral information system and a vocational counseling program would be to 1) increase the credibility of the Navy's recruiting system, 2) enable individuals to have more information available for decision-making, 3) increase the personal acceptance of the choices made, and 4) reduce the perception of the Navy as an inflexible organization.

New recruiting target populations. Earlier, dealing with recruiting of junior college students, we indicated several reasons for our focus on such a population. It appeared to us that junior college students were suitable as a target for Navy recruiters inasmuch as they were likely to possess the necessary intellectual qualifications for enlisting, and they often had technical training that was applicable in Navy settings. It was also apparent that recruiters were paying relatively little attention to such populations, and that the unique needs and qualifications of junior college students were not well reflected in Navy recruiting policies and appeals. This appears to represent an opportunity to increase the potential prospect pool beyond the groups that have been the customary targets.

Interviews with junior college students reveal that they have very little information about the Navy's programs, particularly about how they would specifically benefit from enlisting in the Navy. As several students put it, "The Navy won't give me any more than a high school graduate gets, and I have two additional years of school."

As a response to this situation, we would suggest that the Navy orient its recruiters to more actively pursue this population of junior college students, paying particular attention to their higher qualifications. To our knowledge there is only one aspect of the Navy enlisted recruiting program that reflects the qualifications of junior college students (the Junior College Graduate Training Program). However, it is not a widely used program and few recruiters or college students appear to know of its existence. Specifically, this program allows students with one or more years of college to enter the Navy at grades E-2 or E-3 rather than E-1

In addition to suggesting that Navy recruiters become more active in seeking out junior college students, we would also recommend that additional benefits and incentives be developed that could be tailored to the needs of such a population. For example, data from this project show that the major reason cited by junior college students for not joining the Navy is that civilian educational opportunities appeared to be more attractive to them. Programs which allowed for the facile completion of educational goals could conceivably be devised, and would stand a good change of adding many more highly qualified men to the recruit rosters. These programs could even be expanded to include those who are not yet of college age. To support this, Johnston & Bachman (1972) found that half of the high school students who during high school were considering military service upon graduation, later rejected the idea in order to pursue further education. Many of these qualified young men could conceivably be recruited if the Navy developed more flexible educational incentives. Thus, the Navy may have to adjust its procedures and appeals if it is going to attract such individuals in the future.

Another population that appears to merit additional attention is youth who have not yet reached eligible age for enlistment. As noted in the Gilbert Report (1972) young men aged 16-17 indicate that they are more interested in enlisting in the military than older youth. Apparently, some shift in attitudes is taking place between age 16 and age 18, such that individuals come to view the military in a less positive fashion. That being the case, there is a need to establish a more favorable image of the Navy at an earlier point in time to lessen the likelihood that attitudes will become more negative.

Several steps might be taken to focus more attention on younger groups of potential applicants. As suggested by other investigators (Brown & Callahan, 1973), it might be possible to integrate Navy materials into existing career education programs in the schools, such that youth would be exposed to information about the Navy at an early age. While this approach certainly has merit, it seems unlikely that school systems would be inclined to accept occupational information from the Navy more so than from the other services. Thus, the career education approach, while offering

the individual more information, would not allow much room for the Navy to develop its own distinctive appeal. However, all services might experience a net gain by expanding pre-recruiting activity when the potential pool is most receptive and before it begins to shrink.

Another possibility is to have Navy recruiters begin school visitations at an earlier point in time, beginning with junior high school students and their parents. Such things as offering trips to Naval bases and facilities might be useful tools at this stage of contact. Obviously, such visitations by recruiters would be somewhat limited with such populations; however, it might provide students with information and elevate their awareness so that they could later view the Navy in its proper perspective as a working career alternative.

Innovations Affecting Reenlistment

Within the framework of innovations aimed at influencing reenlistment intentions and career decisions, two courses of action seem appropriate at this time. The first involves "reducing the negative" results of false expectations conveyed by recruiters and by recruit training. The second involves more "accentuating the positive" by developing a stronger program of post-enlistment career counseling.

Improving validity of expectations conveyed by recruiters and by recruit training. Much of the data collected in conjunction with the formulation of the career motivation and socialization model points to the crucial role of expectancy confirmation and disconfirmation in the development of career motivation. While numerous sources may be responsible for generating inappropriate expectations among recruits (i.e., peers, parents, ex-service-men, recruiters, recruit training), the influence generated through recruiters and recruit training are most amenable to direct administrative intervention.

In light of the fact that inappropriate expectations are commonplace among recruits, there is a need to further examine these expectations and pinpoint the expectations that need to be altered to conform more closely to the "reality" of the Navy.

In order to accomplish this task, the influence and perceptions of several different sources need to be considered. In terms of individuals having expectations, it would be most useful to obtain a clear picture of the kinds of expectations they have. Thus, one could obtain from samples of prospects and from samples of men undergoing recruit training descriptions of the kinds of experiences, situations, and conditions they expected to find in the Navy. These statements would comprise two pools of expectations.

A third set of expectations might be obtained by asking recruiters to make statements regarding the kinds of expectancies they usually seek to create for prospects, regarding experiences, living conditions, opportunities, and so forth, to be found in the Navy. A fourth set of expectations could be solicited from groups of instructors at recruit training centers. These individuals would be asked to indicate what sorts of situations they lead recruits to expect when they are actually assigned for duty.

One interesting set of comparisons might involve an examination of the overlaps and gaps between those individuals who help to develop expectations (i.e., recruiters, instructors) and those individuals who are recipients of the information (i.e., prospects and recruits).

Taken together, these four sets of expectations might be combined to form a total pool of expectancies that might be subjected to reality-testing. Reality-testing might be carried out by having a number of knowledgeable individuals rate each expectation in terms of its accuracy vis-a-vis existing conditions in the Navy. Thus, recruiters could be asked to rate accuracy of each expectation in the total pool (without being told who the authors were of the expectancy statements). Similarly, instructors at Recruit Training Centers and enlisted men having three years of Navy experience would rate the entire pool of expectancies in terms of their "accuracy." To the extent that discrepancies are found between expectations and perceptions of real Navy conditions, there exists a need to change expectations or influencing agent (recruiter, instructor) behavior in terms of increasing accuracy.

Inasmuch as specific changes in expectancies could be specified as a result of such procedures, training of recruiters and instructors could be

carried out to give them a better picture of conditions perceived to exist in the Navy (by third-year enlisted men). This training could take place on a small-scale basis where recruiters and instructors would be given responsibility for providing more explicit and realistic information for prospects/recruits regarding the conditions they would be likely to find existing in the service. Presumably the training would aim to reduce the transmission of inappropriate expectancies by recruiters and instructors. The efficacy of this procedure could be evaluated by comparing the expectations of prospects/recruits who came in contact with trained recruiters/instructors (experimental group) with the expectations of prospects/recruits contacting untrained recruiters/instructors (control group). These expectancy statements could then be rated by experienced enlisted men. It would be anticipated that the experimental group's expectancies would be more realistic than expectancies obtained from members of the control group. Measures related to career motivation could also be employed to test the hypothesis that those with more realistic expectations are more favorably disposed toward Navy careers.

This form of recruiter and instructor training, if effective, would provide several important benefits. First, it would give prospects and recruits a more accurate picture of life and work in the Navy, thereby reducing the possibility of dissatisfactions due to expectancy disconfirmation. Second, previous research (Wanous, 1972) indicates that providing job applicants with a more realistic picture of jobs does not deter them from accepting the position. Thus, it might be anticipated that providing prospects with more accurate indications of what to expect in the Navy would have little adverse impact on their ultimate decision to enlist, and would increase the probability of reenlistment. Naturally, evaluation of recruiter/instructor training would have to take such effects into account.

Improving post-enlistment career counseling and career flexibility. While many applicants for Navy programs are concerned about the possibility of losing "fate control" by enlisting, a number of enlisted men state that they have little "fate control" and as a result, do not wish to reenlist. This feeling of powerlessness among enlisted men stems from a number of factors. First, once enlisted men have chosen a particular speciality, there is little

opportunity for them to change jobs or acquire alternate training. Secondly, men are placed in a management system where they have little influence on decisions that affect their lives.

As a means of reducing feelings of powerlessness among enlisted personnel, a number of options seem to be available. These recommendations entail some specific duties for the career counselor in conjunction with various means of making the Navy's career structure more flexible. In addition, various avenues for increasing communication among officers, petty officers and men might be explored, in order to allow men to have greater influence on decisions affecting themselves.

Given that a need exists to provide vocational counseling for prospective enlistees to facilitate their decision-making, similar evidence might be brought to bear in support of increasing the emphasis on career counseling. At the present time, the Navy does provide career counseling for enlisted personnel and has been expanding that program. Yet, it still operates on an infrequent and rather superficial basis. In general, career counselors have a limited range of resources to assist the average enlisted man in his career decision-making. They often engage in counseling as a collateral duty. It should be possible to expand the role and duties of career counselors to enable them to provide the enlisted man with more meaningful career information and more tangible options. It should be possible to conduct a series of administrative experiments, where a variety of options could be made available to enlisted men by career counselors, in the same way that recruiters have authority to make certain binding commitments. These options could take the form of providing them with greater flexibility than is available at present. For example, one could evaluate the effect of shorter or indeterminate enlistments on career motivation. Naturally, the longer the period of time committed by the individual, the more benefits he would receive, such that this option would take a Quid Pro Quo form, and some absolute minimum period might have to be set.

Other options that might be offered by the career counselors could include opportunities to change rates and to obtain training in other fields. Greater flexibility of time commitment also might be brought about by 1) making

sabbatical leave available to enlisted men who spent a minimum period of time in service, or 2) providing for leave without pay. These options would allow men to alternate between the civilian world and the Navy, increasing the individual's job skills and maximizing his potential for both civilian and Navy organizations. Obviously the availability of such options through career counselors would have to be subjected to cost-benefit analysis and early feasibility studies.

Implementing these options for enlisted men might have several beneficial outcomes. First, it would give men flexibility in career decision-making such that more individuals might seriously consider the possibility of reenlisting. Assuming that a number of enlisted men were placed in the "wrong" (from the man's point of view) specialty, allowing them to rectify such errors by changing rates and obtaining additional training instead of getting out of the Navy, might serve to enhance their career motivation and make reenlistment more likely, at a time and dollar cost less than required to find and train a replacement. Second, permitting individuals to commit themselves for shorter or indeterminate terms would reduce their feelings of powerlessness and allow them to perceive that they have some reasonable measure of "fate control" in the Navy. Moreover, if men were not forced to make absolute and final "yes-no" decisions regarding staying in the Navy, more individuals might be inclined to remain longer.

Work in Progress

As has been suggested earlier, there is a need for the Navy to develop alternative means of attracting individuals as well as means for developing career motivation among current personnel. We have previously specified that one can approach these developmental problems from two perspectives: (1) by changing the organization, or (2) by changing incentives associated with enlisting or reenlisting in the Navy.

As part of our current research on the career motivation process, we will be examining the efficacy of the second approach toward enhancing career motivation. Thus, we will be developing and refining incentives designed to attract individuals who would not otherwise enlist in the Navy,

as well as incentives that would increase the likelihood that qualified enlisted personnel would choose to remain in the Navy and make it a career.

Taking our career motivation and socialization model into consideration, many of these incentives will focus on reducing the perceived inflexibility of the Navy (e.g., by offering shorter and indeterminate enlistments), as well as on increasing the benefits received by individuals as a function of the extent of their commitment (e.g., Quid Pro Quo). Our research has revealed that a number of individuals believe that enlisting in the Navy is not consistent with their educational and career goals. For this reason, a number of incentives that will be evaluated in our current research will be concerned with giving such individuals more career and educational flexibility while serving in the Navy.

The focus of this research concerning incentives will be on reducing some of the barriers to career motivation that are evident in our model. Hence, the incentives will be directed toward eliminating some of the negative attributes of the Navy as perceived by potential applicant populations, while at the same time exploring avenues by which men currently in the service could be given more options.

This work will be the subject of forthcoming reports.

FEEDBACK AND FOLLOW-UP TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

It is proposed: (1) that this report be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Personnel and the Commander, Navy Recruiting Command and appropriate members of their staffs; and (2) that the recommendations offered here be made the subject of a series of feedback conferences with officials of the Navy, in order to permit further exploration of the implications of the findings so far developed with knowledgeable people associated with the Navy, and to follow-up with detailed formulation and approval of such administrative experiments as have been described here and/or such other useful interventions that may come out of the feedback conferences.

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APPENDIX A

GUIDE TO INTERVIEWS

GUIDE TO INTERVIEWERS

STUDIES I, II, & IV

The expected outcomes of these interviews are highly specific in nature. Primarily, they are intended to gain information about the factors that have influenced career-oriented decisions such as joining (or not joining) the Navy, rejoining the Navy, or leaving it to pursue some other career. However, we do not just want to know if such factors as money, promotional opportunity and family pressures have been important. We also want to go a little deeper in that we wish to know why such things as the actual factors involved that influenced the decision to enlist (or reenlist) were important. What, psychologically, was the significance of the given factor? Why was it important, i.e., was it because his friends and/or family said it was important? Did his previous experience convince him that the factor was important? Why? In what way? If it was a negative decision for the Navy, how would the factor have had to be changed in order to have made a difference? Why would such a change have made a "difference" in terms of its influence on the person? For example, let us assume that a decrease of six months in required experience before one becomes eligible for promotion has made a difference in reenlistment intention. Why? What is the psychological significance of the change and why does a person see it as significant? Is it because of the opinions of friends? Family? Because of previous experience?

The reason for this level of desired specificity in the interviews is that their primary function is to serve as mechanisms (along with the Questionnaire Survey of Study IV) to enable us to develop and test the effects of specific administrative and policy changes on the enlistment and reenlistment processes through the administrative experiments we will conduct in later

stages of the project. It is the purpose of these interviews to provide us with guides as to the actual specific policy and practice changes which would be worthwhile to evaluate for their potential effectiveness in influencing the enlistment and reenlistment processes. Thus, we need to know from these interviews the actual factors involved in these choice processes as the interviewees perceive them and why they were seen as being important. What was the money involved in the choice and why did it make a difference? How actually should the educational benefits system be changed (i.e., should it be changed in terms of types of training? Length of benefits? Benefits for entire family? How much?) if it is to influence the enlistment and reenlistment process? Why are these changes important? On what basis are they viewed as being important? What was wrong with the leadership and why was it wrong? On what basis was such a judgment made? Answers to questions such as these will provide us with guides as to the characteristics of significant factors influencing decisions and the dynamics underlying such decisions. Experiments can then be designed which can take these into account in evaluating different procedures for affecting the enlistment-reenlistment processes.

It is these types of questions that need to be the primary focus of the interview. A general procedure for all interviews, then, should be the necessity for continued probing with these considerations in mind. It is out of such probing that suggestions and guides as to what might make a "difference," or at least what is worth investigating for its effects through experimentation, will come.

In order that such probing take place, it seems clear that the interviews be as open-minded and as non-structured as possible, without it becoming a "gab session." Within such a framework the interviewer will then be able to probe for both the necessary specifics involved and the dynamics that led to

the specific behaviors, utilizing any order and any technique that seems most desirable and appropriate for the given situation. Hence, the questions listed on the different interviews are deliberately quite open and general in nature, with the probing cues being listed separately beneath the given question. These are not meant to be utilized or checked off in any given order. In fact, such a procedure is to be avoided. The goal in each case is to present the question, asking the individual to introspect and describe his feelings and reactions to the questions in any way he sees fit. The probing cues are provided strictly as hints to the interviewer as to the kinds of things which might be influential in given cases (they will not be in all) and they should be used in a flexible, non-ordered manner. The goal of the interview is to provide us with "cognitive maps" of possible specific influences on specific behaviors of interest to us and the dynamics involved in these behaviors. The answer as to whether they are, (or have been) in fact, the influences on behavior proposed will not be provided for us by exploratory interviews such as these. For this, experimentation of the type we will undertake later is necessary. What these interviews can do, however, is provide us with the specific information which we will need if this such experimentation is to achieve the goals we have set for it.

CANDIDATE INTERVIEW GUIDE

(STUDY I)

Begin by verifying that candidate has just spoken to a Navy recruiter, and that it has been first "major" contact with recruiter ..

Introduction

My name is _____. I am with the American Institutes for Research (give business card), which is a private research organization. I am doing research on recruiting for the Navy. Would you mind spending a few minutes talking to me about your contact with the Navy recruiter? (Suggest having a coke or coffee while the interview is going on, if appropriate).

As part of this study, we are interviewing people who have been in touch with Navy recruiters at various stations. I am not going to try to sell you on the Navy or any of the services; I just want to find out how you feel about the Navy and about your discussion with the recruiter, and what led up to your visiting this recruiting station. Let me assure you that your name will not be given to the Navy or anyone else. The information you give me will be strictly confidential .. Do you have any questions?

1. How did you happen to decide to visit a recruiting station?

What led up to it? What happened while you were there?

Probe Questions

Probe different people and situations that may have influenced decision to visit recruiter, in particular, probe role of parents, friends, draft, etc. Who or what was important in influencing his decision? Why? Probe his view of the recruiter and the latter's credibility? Why was he credible? What did he do or say to make such judgment? Why does he use these judgment factors?

Probe the kinds of plans discussed with him. What sort of expectancies did he have before his visits to the recruiter? Were they confirmed or disconfirmed? Which of these were important? Why?

2. What are your plans with regard to the Navy? How likely are you to enlist? Why?

Probe Questions

Look for different decision-making influences such as parents, friends, girl friend, labor market, recruiter. Probe for determining factor in decision such as training desired, other career plans, money, specific organizational characteristics of the Navy (as perceived from outside). Why does he use these as factors for decision-making? What influences the choice of these factors?

3. If you definitely do not want to join the Navy, what else do you have in mind?

Probe Questions

Look for specific alternatives in military or civilian areas. Probe as to why these alternatives fit him better than the Navy. What are the important factors and why are they important? On what basis are they important?

4. If you are undecided about joining the Navy, what kinds of changes would convince you to join?

Probe Questions

Probe specific sorts of changes that would be required. What sorts of pay changes, commitments in training or assignments, organization changes would have to be undertaken? Why would these be important?

Fill in the appropriate information:

_____ Age _____ Number of dependents
_____ Marital status _____ Educational background
 _____ Current employment

JUNIOR COLLEGE INTERVIEW GUIDE

(STUDY II)

Introduction

My name is _____. I am with the American Institutes for Research (give business card), which is a private research organization. I am doing research on recruiting for the Navy. Would you mind spending a few minutes talking to me about your views regarding the Navy? (Suggest having a coke or coffee while the interview is going on, if appropriate).

As part of this study, we are interviewing college students in an effort to understand their views of the Navy. I am not going to try to sell you on the Navy or any of the services; I just want to find out how you feel about the Navy and any thoughts you may have had about entering or not entering the service. Let me assure you that your name will not be given to the Navy or anyone else. The information you give me will be strictly confidential .. Do you have any questions?

1. Have you given any thought to enlisting in the Navy or any of the other services? Why do you feel that way?

Probe Questions

Probe different people and situations that may have influenced decision regarding the Navy and/or other services, in particular, probe role of parents, friends, draft, labor market, etc. Who or what was important in influencing his decision? Why? Probe for determining factor in decision such as training and educational needs, money, specific organizational characteristics of the Navy (as perceived from outside).

2. If you definitely do not want to join the Navy, what else do you have in mind?

Probe Questions

Look for specific alternatives in military or civilian areas. Probe as to why these alternatives fit him better than the Navy. What are the important factors and why are they important? On what basis are they important.

3. If you are undecided about joining the Navy, what kinds of changes would convince you to join?

Probe Questions

Probe specific sorts of changes that would be required. What sorts of pay changes, commitments in training or assignments, organization changes would have to be undertaken? Why would these be important?

Fill in the appropriate information:

_____ Age	_____ Number of dependents
_____ Marital status	_____ Educational background
	_____ Current employment and/or future employment plans

INTERVIEW GUIDE

(STUDY IV)

Introduction

I am _____ from the American Institutes for Research, a private research organization. The Navy has asked us to undertake a research project designed to develop new ways of making the Navy a more satisfying place to be for all those connected with it. As one part of the project, we are interviewing a number of enlisted men, such as yourself, who have been in the Navy about (less than one year, 2 years, 3-1/2 years) in order to learn something about the experiences you've had, the things you've seen, and your personal reactions to these experiences. Everything you say will be treated confidentially. The information we give to the Navy will not permit any individual to be identified. However, when we gather together your experiences and opinions with those of others we are interviewing, the information analyzed will be used to help make the Navy a better place to work, to live, and for some people, to follow a career.

Section I - Your Career Plans

1. What are your plans at this time? How likely or what are the odds at this time that you will reenlist? Why do you feel this way at this time?

Probe Questions

Probe for influence of factors such as Naval organization policies and practices in various areas, the leadership he has been exposed to, the job market as he sees it for people like himself, his life style, family pressures, etc. Specific instances and cases of possible determining factors should be sought. When a determining factor has been isolated, probe for reasons for its importance and the basis used for judging that this factor was important (e.g.,

influence of friends? family? recruiter? previous experience?)

2. If you are definitely leaving the Navy, do you know where you are going job-wise (civilian or military)? if yes, what kind of job and/or organization do you expect to find there? If no, what kind of job or organization do you expect to find when you get a job?

Probe Questions

Probe for the specific kinds of job expectancies which these people have for the non-Naval context and the manner in which these expectancies differ from the experiences they had at the Navy. Probe for the specific instances and cases where confirmed or disconfirmed expectancies influenced them. What were the characteristics of each case? Why were these expectancies and their confirmation or disconfirmations important? What influences the "importance" judgment?

3. If you are undecided about staying in the Navy, what are the kinds of things that would influence you to stay in? What things would influence you to get out?

Probe Questions

Probe for the specific changes which would have to be made. If money, how much money? If promotional opportunities need to be changed, how? If non-Navy factors (i.e., family pressure, labor market, etc.) how? In what way? etc. Why are these factors important? What influences the importance judgment?

Section II - Fill in the appropriate information for each of the following demographic variables:

Age _____ Race _____

Marital State _____

No. of Dependents (Including Self) _____

Pay Grade _____

Educational Background (Prior to Naval Enlistment)

Rating _____

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